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I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination happens all the time. Employers discriminate
on the basis of previous experience.1 Lenders discriminate on the
basis of financial history.2  Property and casualty insurers
discriminate based on applicants' risk profiles. 3  And-as law
students know all too well--educational institutions and
prospective employers discriminate on the basis of grades. 4 Yet,
what makes some instances of discrimination permissible and
others prohibited? This Article explores a novel form of
discrimination, "healthism," or discrimination on the basis of
health status, and provides a theoretical framework for
understanding when differentiating on the basis of health is
acceptable and when such differentiation should constitute legally
restricted discrimination.
To be sure, health status is not a widely recognized
antidiscrimination category akin to race, religion, gender, age,
disability, and more recently, genetic information and sexual
orientation. 5 In the wake of comprehensive federal health-care
I See, e.g., Alison Griswold, The Absurd Problem with Most Entry-Level Jobs, Bus.
INSIDER (Feb. 28 2014, 3:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/entry-level-job-require
ments-2014-2 (noting that "more and more positions that are billed as entry level" are
actually "designed for young professionals whose resumes include a few years of work
experience" in addition to their college degrees).
2 See Five Cs of Credit - What Lenders Look For, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.
com/financial-education/credit-management/five-c/ (last visited May 25, 2016) (observing
that lenders assess a potential borrower's credit risk based in large part on credit and
payment history, among other factors, before granting a loan).
3 See Insider Information: How Insurance Companies Measure Risk,
INSURANCECOMPANIES.COM (last visited May 25, 2016) C'rnsurance companies use a
methodology called risk assessment to calculate premium rates for policyholders.").
4 See, e.g., Getting a Law Job with Average Grades, LEXIS NEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (Nov.
21, 2012, 2:21 PM), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lexis-hub/b/careerguidance/
archive/2012/11/21/getting-a-law-job-with-average-grades.aspx ("[There are certainly [law]
firms out there that might not consider anyone with a GPA under a specific cutoff ... ").
Discrimination based on race, religion, gender, age, disability, genetic information, and
sexual orientation are prohibited under various statutes, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, as well as Executive
Orders; health status is generally not included in these protected categories. Facts About
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reform, however, various entities have become increasingly
interested in categorizing individuals based on their health status.
The rhetoric casting the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a "civil
rights bill for the sick" and employers' growing interest in
screening employees for health-related information inspired one of
the authors to contemplate whether health status should be
understood as a novel, independent antidiscrimination category. 6
The ACA notoriously prohibits private health insurers from
considering individual health-risk profiles in underwriting,
ratemaking, or renewals, subject to several exceptions. 7 Recent
litigation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) challenged employers' ability to obtain information about
their employees' health in conjunction with employer-provided
wellness programs.8 While the employers prevailed, those cases
demonstrate that issues involving access to and use of health
information remain both unsettled and contentious.
The possibilities for health-based differentiation are not
confined to health insurance and employment. Any number of
entities and individuals might consider a person's health status a
Discrimination in Federal Government Employment Based on Marital Status, Political
Affiliation, Status as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, EEOC, https://
www.eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfin (last visited May 25, 2016).
6 See generally Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism": A Critique of the Antidiscrimination
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159
[hereinafter Roberts, Insurance]; Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment
Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571 (2014) [hereinafter Roberts, Employment].
I See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (describing how
the ACA's "guaranteed-issue" and "community-rating" provisions prohibit insurance
companies from denying coverage to those with preexisting conditions or other health issues
or charging less healthy individuals higher premiums than healthy individuals (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg to -4 (2012))).
8 See, e.g., EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173482 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 30,
2015) (allege violations of the ADA); EEOC v. Honeywell Intl Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157945 (D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2014) (alleging violations of the ADA and GINA); see also Press
Release, EEOC, EEOC Lawsuit Challenges Flambeau Over Wellness Program (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/10-1-14b.cfn (alleging Flambeau "violated federal
law by requiring an employee to submit to medical testing and assessment in connection with
a 'wellness program' "); Lewis Krauskopf & Mica Rosenberg, U.S. Judge Denies EEOC Bid to
Stop Honeywell Wellness Penalty, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://www.reuterscomlar
ticle/honeywell-int-eeoc-idUSLNOST26K20141103 (reporting that a federal judge rejected
the EEOC's bid to prevent Honeywell from imposing penalties on workers who refuse to be
tested as part of the company's wellness program).
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relevant basis on which to deny or extend certain services,
privileges, or opportunities. We address the larger question of
when the law should intervene to prohibit considerations of health
status. As we begin to explore the implications of health status
discrimination outside the contexts of health insurance and
employment, this Article represents a crucial step. It provides a
theoretically and practically robust framework for extending the
project into a variety of other spheres, including health-care
access, public health, reproductive technology, the marketplace,
and the judicial system.
The central question for this Article is: What is healthism? Or,
more specifically, when do government or private actors use health
status in a way that result in a normative wrong? Discrimination
can mean many things,9 and in the past half-century, scholars
have developed a deep body of work on the subject. We draw on
that literature to inform our understanding of discrimination and
define a possible new protected category: the unhealthy, or those
with poor health statuses. But we do so guardedly, recognizing the
U.S. Supreme Court's concern about the proliferation of
classifications seeking legal protection.10
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the
existing literature on discrimination on the basis of health status
and how it falls short of providing a clear definition of healthism.
Part III examines circumstances in which differentiating on the
basis of health status does not rise to the level of discrimination.
Part IV offers a theoretical framework for distinguishing between
9 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153 (1992) (addressing "the
question of what makes discrimination wrongful by examining discrimination as an
expression of various types of preferences").
10 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747 (2011)
(discussing "pluralism anxiety," or "the fear that we are fracturing into fiefs that do not
speak with each other"); id. at 774 (discussing the Supreme Court's concern, iterated in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), that exempting religious practices
from generally applicable laws "would permit 'every citizen to become a law unto himself "
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))); see also Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (acknowledging that the Court has "an initial inclination in
these cases to proceed with caution").
2016]
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discriminatory and non-discriminatory health-based
differentiations. We conclude that considerations of health status,
like the antidiscrimination categories of gender and disability, are
sometimes warranted, making a blanket ban on healthism both
unworkable and unappealing. Thus, we urge greater protection
for the unhealthy from unfair discrimination while building into
the paradigm exceptions for when it is appropriate to take health
status into account.
II. WHAT IS HEALTHISM?
Health status as a potential antidiscrimination category and
healthism as a theory of unjustifiable discrimination are new and
evolving concepts. Jessica L. Roberts first repurposed the term
healthism in her work on health insurance and later expanded the
concept to employment." Part II outlines her previous work in
this area, identifying various unanswered questions that we seek
to resolve in Part IV.
A. ROBERTS ON HEALTHISM
Political science scholarship has employed the term "healthism"
to refer to government promotion of coercive health norms.1 2 In
her writing, Roberts created an alternate meaning for the term as
referring to discrimination on the basis of health status. 3 By this
account, healthism joins the other familiar "isms," such as racism,
sexism, ageism, and ableism. Roberts clarified and refined her
definition of healthism in her previous articles, and this Article
seeks to provide the definitive explication of the term.
1. Previous Definitions. Discrimination in its simplest sense
denotes any form of differentiation. 14 Within the law (especially
1 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
12 See Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1171 ("The traditional concept of healthism
involves the government's promotion of coercive health norms, and its attempts to impose
lifestyle choices deemed 'healthy' on its citizens.").
' See generally id.
,4 See id. at 1172 ("[The word discriminate, as defined in the dictionary, simply means to
differentiate."); Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2097, 2109 (2015) [hereinafter Roberts, Privacy] (defining discrimination).
838 [Vol. 50:833
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antidiscrimination law), the term takes on a pejorative
connotation.1 5 Thus, discrimination in the legal sense stands for
undesirable differentiation. 16 In other words, "discrimination is
the subset of differentiation that has been judged morally
'wrong.' "17 What makes that form of discrimination wrong,
however, is culturally and historically dependent.' 8 Frequently,
the attribute that is the basis of the differentiation-for example,
race or sex-has been of central importance for various purposes
and contexts. 19 The degree to which the particular characteristic
entails recognized personal or social significance, or has been the
basis of widespread subordination in the past, are both relevant to
determining if differentiation based on that characteristic is
discriminatory in the legal sense. 20
Antidiscrimination has traditionally been separated into
distinct but complementary frameworks: antisubordination and
anticlassification. 21 Pursuant to the antisubordination principle,
antidiscrimination law strives to elevate the social status of
15 See Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1172 ("When used derisively, discrimination
indicates that a normative wrong occurs either in the course of, or as the result of, making
[a] distinction."); Roberts, Privacy, supra note 14, at 2109-10 (discussing what separates a
"wrong" discrimination from a not wrong discrimination).
16 Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1172-74 (describing socially undesirable
discrimination); Roberts, Privacy, supra note 14, at 2109-11 (same).
17 Roberts, Privacy, supra note 14, at 2109.
18 See Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1172-73 (providing various illustrations of
how the distinctions among discrimination rely on culture and history); Roberts, Privacy,
supra note 14, at 2110 ("Often the determination of whether a practice is discriminatory in
the pejorative sense turns on whether the conduct in question leads to disadvantage on the
basis of a characteristic that either has personal or social relevance, or has been the basis
for systematic social subjugation in the past.").
19 See Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1174 (discussing the various social categories
that have been considered legally inappropriate grounds for discrimination); Roberts,
Privacy, supra note 14, at 2110 (same).
20 See Roberts, Privacy, supra note 14, at 2110 (distinguishing discrimination from
irrational or arbitrary differentiation).
21 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9-10 (2003). There are of
course other antidiscrimination paradigms. See Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class
Gatekeeping, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (discussing the anti-
essentialism and anti-balkanization theories of antidiscrimination).
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historically subjugated groups.22  The law should reform
institutions and practices that enforce the secondary treatment of
historically oppressed individuals. 23  In so doing, the
antisubordination view prohibits acts that even unintentionally
create disparities, as well as supports positive differential
treatment, like accommodations and affirmative action. 24
Determining what constitutes discrimination under the
antisubordination approach is open-ended, inviting debate about
which practices, utterances, or institutional arrangements are
subordinating. 25  Pohcymaking also involves value judgments
about which dignitary distinctions or distributive arrangements
are unjust and how the legal system should address those wrongs.
Alternatively, the anticlassification approach advocates
outlawing all intentional differential treatment on the basis of a
particular status.26 Consequently, anticlassification protections do
not reach unintentional discrimination, nor do they allow for
positive considerations of any kind.27 Anticlassification requires
no independent normative wrong, because under this view, the
classification itself is the wrong. Thus, while antisubordination
would seek to elevate the social status of a historically
disadvantaged group, such as people of color or women,
anticlassification would prohibit all considerations of race and
gender, even affirmative action provisions designed to correct prior
wrongs. 28
22 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 21, at 9 ("Antisubordination theorists contend that
guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social
stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the
secondary social status of historically oppressed groups.").
23 Id.
24 See id. at 11 ("Mhe antisubordination principle impugned facially neutral practices
with a racially disparate impact, while legitimating affirmative action.").
25 See id. at 14 ("The question of what practices or utterances or institutional
arrangements might be subordinating involves interpretive judgments ... which [are]
plainly contestable.").
2 See id. at 10 ("[The anticlassification] principle holds that the government may not
classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category for
example, their race.").
27 Id.
28 See id. at 12 ('The anticlassification principle impugned affirmative action, while
legitimating facially neutral practices with a racially disparate impact....).
840 [Vol. 50:833
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We can apply these different antidiscrimination paradigms to
the context of healthism. Try inserting "health" into a traditional
definition of discrimination: "Stated most simply, the
antidiscrimination principle disfavors [health status] -dependent
decisions and conduct-at least when they selectively
disadvantage the members of a minority [unhealthy] group."29
Having crafted a working definition of "healthism," we can proceed
to consider how that new category would operate under either
antisubordination or anticlassification. An antisubordination
perspective would seek to eradicate systematic disadvantage on
the basis of health status, whereas anticlassification would take a
"health-blind" approach. 30  Thus, an antisubordination law
targeting healthism would attempt to address the subordinated
social status of a subjugated group-specifically "the sick" or "the
unhealthy"-by attempting to eradicate both intentional and
unintentional disparities. By contrast, an anticlassification law
would forbid all intentional considerations of health, even for
benign purposes, such as remedying a history of past
discrimination, 31 or promoting healthier lifestyles or outcomes.
While not explicitly addressing the antisubordination-
anticlassification distinction, Roberts' prior definition of healthism
most closely tracks the antisubordination principle. She notes
that discrimination can be understood on both group and
individual terms. 32 She also explains that discrimination can be
intentional or unintentional and that differential treatment can
29 Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1, 6 (1976).
30 Even though blindness rhetoric leaves something to be desired from a disability rights
perspective, we use the term "health-blind" to mirror the well-accepted vocabulary of
"colorblindness." So why "healthism" and not "sickism"? Roberts's definition seems to have
more to do with addressing the disadvantage against the sick than outlawing health-based
differentiation. Yet, even classic antisubordination approaches to discrimination take their
name from the attribute and not the historically subordinated group, i.e., sexism rather
than womanism.
31 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 21, at 18 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court
appeared to take an anticlassification approach to discrimination).
32 Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1172.
2016] 841
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have both positive and negative effects.33 Roberts then goes on to
explain that "while far from the only acceptable definition, for [her
purposes], discrimination means systematic disadvantage related
to a protected trait or status."34 She therefore adopts a definition
that captures disparate impact discrimination. It is not enough for
there to be a classification; there must also be systematic
disadvantage. Finally, by requiring the disadvantageous effect of
the policy to be on a systematic-not merely an individual-level,
Roberts avoids advocating that a single instance of disadvantage
could render a policy discriminatory.
Roberts subsequently refined her definition of healthism by
explaining that discrimination on the basis of health status would
include both health-related traits as well as health-related
conduct.3 5 With respect to conduct, Roberts limited her analysis to
discrimination based on tobacco or nicotine use and obesity. 36
Admittedly, there are myriad other activities and conduct that
bear on health-for example, alcohol consumption, seatbelt and
helmet use, recreational sports (skiing, racecar driving, skydiving,
mountain climbing, bungee jumping), sun-tanning, occupational
hazards, and stress. In this Article, we engage the wider range of
health-related conduct, beyond tobacco/nicotine and obesity. We
also venture to include within our definition both static health
conditions that are seemingly beyond the individual's control
(including legally protected disabilities) and voluntary health-
related conduct that is at the whim and will of the individual.
Our inclusion of health-related conduct is necessary to fully
consider the question of healthism as well as consistent with
existing discrimination law. Classically, discrimination law has
drawn distinctions between "mutable" and "immutable" traits,
recognizing the constitutional guarantee of equal protection for the
latter (e.g., race, gender, ethnicity, national origin) but not the
former.37 The rationale for that distinction is that individuals
3 Id. at 1173-74.
34 Id. at 1174 (emphasis in original).
3 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 604.
36 Id.
37 Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2015).
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should not be disadvantaged on the basis of traits that they did not
choose, did not cause, and cannot change. 38 On the other hand, if
the trait or characteristic is something within individuals' control,
it may seem fair to treat them differently on that basis. In that
way, the law can appropriately incentivize individuals to alter
their "bad" conduct or choices and gain the privileges enjoyed by
others who make "good" choices.
In our effort to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable health-status discrimination, it is tempting to rely on
that same underlying assumption: namely, that there are certain
situations in which the law properly should treat individuals
differently based on choices they freely and voluntarily make
about their health to encourage those individuals to make better
choices. At the same time, we want to carve out a set of health-
related statuses, traits, conditions, or conduct that should be
protected from disadvantage, regardless of voluntariness. We, like
many courts and commentators, 39 have found this a very difficult
line to draw.
First, it is not always clear which conduct or traits are truly
voluntary. Although it may be tempting to think of obesity as the
result of poor self-control, overeating, and lack of exercise, it may,
in fact, be the product of a physiological condition or body
chemistry. 40 Even more nettlesome, individuals often are limited
in their choices about diet and exercise by socioeconomic
conditions, including education, income, and access to healthy
foods and safe recreational options-what the public health
literature refers to as "social determinants of health."41
See id. (explaining that one rationale behind the illegality of discriminating on the
basis of immutable traits is that they were not chosen); see also Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (describing immutable traits as "accident[s] of birth").
3 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 37, at 45 (noting that the expanded notion of immutability
creates a line-drawing problem because it "does not have any limiting principle").
40 What Causes Overweight and Obesity?, NAT'L HEART, LUNG & BLOOD INST., http:/!
www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics-obe-causes (last visited May 28, 2016) (listing
physiological and body chemistry conditions, such as hyperthyroidism and Cushing's
syndrome, as potential causes of obesity).
11 See Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role for
Providers, GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10-11) (describing what
2016] 843
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Second, antidiscrimination law has moved beyond
immutability, extending to various traits or categories that are
arguably within the individual's control, including religion, sexual
orientation, marital status, and union or military affiliation. 42
Courts have reasoned that extending substantive guarantees to
those categories is consistent with the mutability principle either
because such characteristics are very difficult, as a practical
matter, to change, or because they are so fundamental to
personhood that "it would be abhorrent for government to penalize
a person for refusing to change them.' '43 That notion intuitively
applies to religion. People have a choice about whether to practice
a certain religion, yet we still may conclude that discrimination on
that basis is wrongful." Likewise, individuals may choose to
engage in unhealthy conduct, such as smoking. But we
nevertheless may conclude that it is unfair to discriminate against
smokers. Put simply, immutability gets our healthism project only
so far.
In sum, under Roberts's prior work, the test for whether a
particular practice can be properly identified as healthist involves
a two-part inquiry: (1) Does it differentiate (by intent or by effect)
on the basis of health status (including traits and conduct); and (2)
Does that differentiation result in a normative wrong? The more
difficult question, not fully addressed in her previous work on
healthism, is when is it normatively wrong to consider health
status, and when is it normatively acceptable-perhaps even
desirable? On deeper consideration, we now acknowledge that
differentiation based on health status may not always be wrong
and may even be beneficial, in some instances. This Article offers
a much-needed rubric for distinguishing between good versus bad
health-status differentiation.
constitutes the "social determinants of Health"). Social determinants of health may in fact
be the next frontier in health policy.
42 Clarke, supra note 37, at 8 n.12.
43 Id. at 3 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 152 (discussing the wrongfulness of discriminating on
the basis of mutable characteristics, such as religion).
844 [Vol. 50:833
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2. Previous Applications. Roberts developed her concept of
healthism by examining the operation of socially undesirable
differentiation in the health insurance and employment contexts.
We provide a quick review of those applications as a jumping off
point for out extending the analysis into other contexts.
a. Health Insurance. Roberts first introduced her concept of
healthism into legal scholarship with her article "Healthism" A
Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance
and Health-Care Reform.45 Pre-ACA, health insurers routinely
based underwriting and ratemaking determinations on individual
risk profiles, including individual states of health, predispositions
to illness, and health-related risk factors.46 In that sense, Roberts
asserted that the private, for-profit health insurance industry is
inherently discriminatory, at least in the value-neutral sense of
classifying subscribers. 47
Additionally, rhetoric characterizing the American health
insurance industry as discriminating against the sick animated
public and congressional debates surrounding the ACA.
Congressional testimony and the popular press were awash in
highly sympathetic stories of individuals being denied coverage or
having coverage revoked precisely when they needed it most.48 In
attempting to address that type of discrimination, the ACA
prohibits insurers from refusing to issue policies because the
applicant has preexisting conditions or from rescinding coverage
after an insured develops a medical condition. 49 In addition, the
ACA requires most policies to be priced without regard to
individual health status or health risk.50 The ACA therefore
attempts to improve health insurance coverage, and in turn
15 See generally Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6.
46 See id. at 1166-70 (detailing pre-ACA health insurance practices and their
ramifications).
47 Id. at 1189.
48 See, e.g., id. at 1175 (citing 155 CONG. REC. H8105 (daily ed. July 15, 2009) (statement
of Rep. Edward Perlmutter)) (describing Representative Perlmutter's story about his
daughter, who was uninsurable before the ACA because of her epilepsy).




health-care access, for individuals in need of medical treatment. 51
That said, the ACA continues to allow differential pricing in
certain contexts based on a few, select factors-namely, tobacco
use, age, and geography.5 2
For purposes of her work on health insurance, Roberts takes a
broad view of health-status discrimination. She includes not only
diagnosed health conditions, illnesses, and diseases but also
genetic and other predispositions to illness or injury. 53 In short,
her definition of "health status" encompasses any health-related
risk indicator on which an insurer might base its decision whether
to offer coverage and how much to charge for it.
Admittedly, those sorts of risk indicators are essential to health
insurance underwriting and ratemaking under a classic, actuarial
fairness model.54 Each insured pays based on his individual risk
profile. 55  Single, young-adult men typically pay more for
automobile insurance than married, middle-aged women. 56
Homeowners living in flood plains pay more for flood insurance
than high-ground, inland dwellers.57 Pre-ACA, individuals with
51 It appears that similar issues persist post-healthcare reform. See, e.g., Valarie Blake,
Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:
Recalling the Purpose of Health Insurance and Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 63, 68
(2015) (discussing the rise of narrow networks and the problems they create).
52 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
5 See generally id.
5 See id. at 1164-66 (describing the health insurance underwriting systems); see also
Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 73, 74 (2005) ('"Discrimination against unhealthy persons is deeply ingrained in the
health insurance industry and traditionally has been generally accepted as a legitimate
application of underwriting and risk-classification principles."); Elizabeth Pendo, Working
Sick.- Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y & L.
ETHICS 453, 461 (2009) (discussing the difficulties of attaining individual insurance
coverage for people with chronic illness).
55 Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 287, 290 (1993).
6 See Katie Lobosco, Singles Pay More for Car Insurance, CNN (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:05
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/26/pf/insurance/car-insurance-single-married/ (stating
that single twenty-year-olds pay more for car insurance than married people of the same
age, and that young men pay more than young women).
57 See Drying Up 6 Myths About Flood Insurance, BANKEATE, http://www.bankrate.coml
finance/insurance/flood-insurance-2.aspx (last visited May 28, 2016) (noting that the price of
flood insurance depends on the home's value and whether or not the home is located in a
floodplain).
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preexisting conditions, if insurable at all,58 would pay more than
individuals who have not yet gotten sick or injured.59  The
insurance companies' wager is a losing proposition if they sell
policies only to those sure to use the coverage offered.
The ACA is not the only federal law that attempts to address
healthism in health insurance. Existing laws, however, are
limited to certain contexts or certain traits. For example, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) limits the ability of group health plans to impose
preexisting condition exclusions, make eligibility decisions, and
charge higher premiums on individuals with health conditions.60
Also, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA) prohibits discrimination in health insurance and
employment on the basis of genetic information. 61 The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) prohibits discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 62
None of those laws, however, protect the public broadly against
health-status discrimination.
Lawmakers and advocates therefore trumpeted the ACA as a
sweeping antidiscrimination statute that would end, across the
board, insurers' longstanding healthist practices across insurance
markets. 63 Indeed, the ACA, in most respects, rejects actuarial
58 Typically, an individual must have a desirable risk profile to be able to obtain
insurance. See David Edward Marcinko, Insurable Risk, in DICTIONARY OF HEALTH
INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE (2006 ed.) (defining "insurance risk" as an insured with
acceptable requirements to an insurance company).
59 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C.).
61 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
62 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
6 See, e.g., Patricia Zengerle, Most Americans Oppose Health Law But Like Provisions,
REUTERS (June 24, 2012, 1:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-campaign-healt
hcare-idUSBRE85N1M20120624 (noting strong public support for provisions of the ACA
that ban insurance companies from denying coverage to those with preexisting conditions
and characterizing Democratic support for the bill as "an effort to improve the lives of
Americans").
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fairness in favor of a "mutual aid" model of health insurance. 64 By
requiring insurers to cover most individuals, and to charge them
all the same premiums, the ACA effects broad cross-subsidization.
Those who ordinarily would pay more for their health insurance
because of poor health statuses are subsidized at the expense of
those who ordinarily would pay less because of their good health
statuses.65
Roberts ultimately concludes that existing federal laws,
including the ACA, fall short of the mark as antidiscrimination
legislation.66 While applauding the general direction of the ACA in
terms of eradicating unfair healthism in health insurance, Roberts
concludes that the remaining carve-outs for differential pricing
effectively perpetuate insurers' healthist practices. 67  Age, for
example, is a rough proxy for health status, as elderly people tend
to experience more health problems than younger people.68 Price
discrimination for tobacco usage classifies and subordinates
individuals based on health-related behavior or conduct.69 By
discriminating based on age, tobacco use, and geography, insurers
can recreate most of the price tiers that they customarily imposed
pre-ACA.70 Given the failure of federal anti-healthism legislation,
Roberts proposes an alternative strategy for addressing the
problem of access to affordable health insurance by unhealthy
individuals: fundamental rights (substantive due process-style)
6 See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA_ L. REV. 1577, 1600 (2011) (asserting that the ACA
rejects the concept of actuarial fairness).
65 Larry Levitt, The Numbers Behind "Young Invincibles" and the Affordable Care Act,
KFF.ORG (Dec. 17, 2013) (explaining how "young people must enroll in sufficient numbers to
produce a surplus in premium revenues that can be used to cross-subsidize the deficit
created by the enrollment of older people").
G Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1190-94 (explaining that "the new health-care
system disadvantages the same populations as its predecessor" because insurers can still
consider individuals' health information).
67 See id. at 1190 ("Because the statute effectively allows insurers to consider information
that corresponds to an individual's health, the statute thus perpetuates health-status
discrimination.").
68 Id. at 1191.
6 Id. at 1193.
70 Id. at 1193-94.
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claims, rather than discrimination (equal protection-style)
claims. 71
To summarize, Roberts's work on healthism in the health
insurance context takes a broad view of "health status," including
a wide range of factors bearing on health. She begins from the
normative position-borrowed from advocates of the ACA-that
health-status discrimination in health insurance markets is a bad
thing, and then considers whether the ACA or other existing laws
address the problem. 72  But her analysis assumes without
explaining or deciding why discrimination based on health status
is necessarily bad. From an insurer's perspective, there are many
economically rational reasons for distinguishing between the
healthy and unhealthy and treating the latter less favorably.
Later in this Article, we consider additional rationales for
differentiating on the basis of health status-namely, incentivizing
individuals to take fewer health risks and to maintain better
overall states of health.
b. Employment. In her second relevant article, Healthism
and the Law of Employment Discrimination, Roberts focused on
health-status discrimination in employment.73 She applied her
healthism paradigm to the increasingly prevalent trend of
'lifestyle discrimination," illustrated through employers' treating
workers differently based on out-of-work conduct or activities. 74
Lifestyle discrimination refers to employment policies based on a
wide range of activities, including diet, recreational sports, sleep
habits, substance use, childbearing, political activities or
affiliations, social and sexual activities, moonlighting, and other
7' Id. at 1197.
72 See generally id.
73 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 575.
74 Id. at 608; see also M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1517, 1517 (2009) (assessing the merits of state and corporate "nanny limitations" and
arguing that lifestyle policies are fair and efficient); Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle"
Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 381 (2003) (exploring
whether and when society should intervene "to preclude employers from making hiring,
promotion, discharge, discipline and other job decisions based on off-the-job conduct").
2016] 849
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
conduct that occurs outside the employment context.7 5 Some but
not all of these extracurricular activities bear on workers' health.
Roberts focuses on two examples of health-related lifestyle
discrimination: nicotine use and obesity.76  Citing various
examples, she argues that employers who adopt policies against
hiring nicotine users or severely overweight individuals are
healthist because they classify and subordinate potential
employees based on legal conduct that tends to correlate with poor
health.77 This type of discrimination turns not on the workers'
static health conditions, but rather on their health-related
behaviors. Hence, as suggested above, our discussion of healthism
addresses not only health status but health habits.
Similar to her conclusion in the insurance context, Roberts
concludes that existing federal employment laws fail to protect
individuals from that new form of unfair discrimination. 78 A
number of federal laws restrict workplace discrimination against
individuals with definable disabilities and other diagnosable
health conditions, as well as against individuals with genetic
predisposition to illness. 79 No federal law, however, offers similar
protection to workers engaged in health-risky conduct, such as
smoking or a sedentary lifestyle.80  Although framed in
antidiscrimination rhetoric, the ACA, in particular, fails to close
that gap.8 ' As Roberts observes, the ACA actually encourages
such differentiation in two ways: first, by explicitly allowing
premium rate discrimination based on tobacco use,82 and second,
75 Sugarman, supra note 74, at 384-95 (identifying a wide range of off-duty behaviors
and life styles, including cohabitation, homosexuality, civic or political activities, drunk
driving seatbelt wearing, and criminal activity, on which employers have based employment
decisions).
76 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 575.
77 Id. at 575-76.
78 Id. at 575.
79 See id. at 594-607 (discussing ADA, HIPAA, and GINA).
80 See id. at 575 (noting that while several states have passed legislation prohibiting
employers from discriminating on the basis of legal lifestyle choices, there is presently "no
federal counterpart").
81 See id. at 593-94 (explaining that "current federal employment discrimination statutes
offer little protection against those practices").
82 Id. at 603.
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by authorizing workplace wellness programs, which allow
employers to offer premium discounts and other rewards to
employees who participate in smoking cessation, weight reduction,
and other health-promotion programs.8 3  To the extent that
nicotine users and overweight individuals are unable to comply
with the workplace wellness incentives, those programs
perpetuate discrimination. Those policies also further stigmatize
nicotine users and overweight individuals by highlighting their
own failures to adopt healthier habits, rather than considering
larger societal contributors to tobacco- and weight-related health
statuses.84 To guard against healthism in employment, Roberts
advocates broadening federal workplace antidiscrimination laws to
include lifestyle discrimination legislation.85 Her federal solution
is modeled on similar statutes already adopted in a number of
states.Y
Roberts's work in the employment context comes closer to
offering an explanation for why health-status discrimination is
normatively wrong. The health statuses that Roberts considered
bear little, if any, relevance to the individuals' ability to perform
their essential job tasks. Indeed, one of the primary critiques of
lifestyle discrimination policies is that smoking, overeating, not
exercising, skydiving, political leanings, or failure to wear
sunblock, seatbelts, or motorcycle helmets are not activities that
affect one's job duties; the out-of-work conduct is thus not a good
proxy for work ability.8 7 Moreover, to the extent that otherwise
forbidden characteristics are relevant to the job duties,
8 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10408, 124 Stat.
978 (2010).
84 For a discussion of wellness programs' failure to address the social determinants of
health, see Jessica L. Roberts & Leah Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May Undermine
Wellness Programs, HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2816924.
85 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 607-08.
86 Id.
87 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 158 (discussing the difference between acceptable and
"morally troublesome" preferences for people, particularly in the employment context).
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employment discrimination law already recognizes an exception in
the form of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).88
Even more troubling to Roberts, historically disadvantaged
groups are more likely to engage in the particular unhealthy
conduct that she considers. She cites statistics revealing that
tobacco use and obesity is more prevalent among racial and ethnic
minorities, the disabled, and the poor.8 9  Therefore, lifestyle
discrimination policies tend to exacerbate existing inequalities. 9
On that basis, Roberts advocates expanding federal laws, not so
much to recognize a new protected category-the unhealthy-but
to better ensure legal protection for already subordinated groups.9 1
Accordingly, she argues for reform of existing laws, but stops short
of suggesting that healthism be recognized as a new, independent
form of discrimination. 92
B. CRITIQUES AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Roberts's previous scholarship on healthism leaves a key
question unanswered. Specifically, while requiring a normative
wrong as an element of her healthism definition, she fails to
identify what makes treating individuals differently based on
health status problematic, other than the tendency to exacerbate
existing inequalities based on other recognized categories. 93 But
the question that we now aim to answer is: What makes some
differentiations on the basis of health status socially acceptable
and others socially undesirable or unfair? Additionally, while
Roberts's inclusion of health-related conduct or habits-not merely
unhealthy conditions or diagnoses-is defensible and necessary to
fully address her concerns, it raises a number of issues. As
88 Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law,
88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 14 (2000) (defining BFOQ and discussing examples of preferences of
particular kinds of people).
89 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 616-18.
90 Id. at 616.
91 Id. at 618.
92 See id. at 633 (suggesting that "legislatures could frame the ... protections as privacy-
or autonomy-based protections of lawful conduct so as not to create a substantive 'right'" to
health-risky behaviors).
93 See supra notes 66-71, 78-87 and accompanying text.
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already suggested in our discussion of immutability, the line
between an immutable health condition and mutable health habit
may be quite blurry. Moreover, courts have already crossed that
line, recognizing legal protections for conditions or choices
admittedly within individuals' control. This Part more carefully
unpacks Roberts's working definition of healthism.
1. What Is Health-Status? Although she defines healthism as
differentiation on the basis of health status, Roberts does not
provide a clear definition of what it means to be "healthy. ' 94 The
meaning of this notoriously difficult to define word is implicit in
the terms "healthism" and "health status" and accordingly calls for
closer consideration. 95 The Constitution of the World Health
Organization (WHO) defines "health" as "[a] state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence
of disease or infirmity." While that definition provides an
admirable aspiration for international human rights standards, it
is far too broad for our purposes.97
A functional definition of "healthy" (or conversely, "unhealthy")
must include both a descriptive and normative element.98
Descriptively, one can say that a person is "healthy" when his body
functions at a particular level.99 Disease, then, is defined as a
9 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 576.
95 BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS
JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 15-16 (7th
ed. 2013) (discussing the importance of defining health and presenting several possible
definitions); LAWRENCE 0. GOsTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 7-8 (2d
ed. 2008) (discussing the foundational importance of health). See generally Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325
(2010) (evaluating the treatment and consideration of health in state constitutions).
96 Constitution of the World Health Organization, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.
int/governance/eb/whoconstitutionen.pdf (last visited May 31, 2016).
9 Even champions of a "right to health" are careful not to claim a right to be healthy as
an absolute state, but rather the right to a system of health protection and equal
opportunity to enjoy the "highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."
GOSTIN, supra note 95, at 276 (excerpt from U.N. ICESCR, 2000); see also id. at 276-83
(elaborating on definitions of health and limitations on the definitions).
98 See Christopher Boorse, On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 49, 52-53 (1975) (defining "weak normativism" and citing examples).
99 See, e.g., id. at 50 (observing that "health is normality").
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functional limitation.1°° A "healthy" individual exemplifies the
ideal Platonic form of the body, while an "unhealthy" individual
possesses some function or organ that departs from that ideal. 10 1
Under this definition, a person with lung cancer or diabetes is
certainly "unhealthy." This definition would also include anyone
with any sort of impairment-whether visual, hearing, mobility, or
otherwise-as those individuals would not fall within the "normal"
range of function. 10 2 Under a functionalist definition, health and
disability are therefore incompatible categories. 10 3
But it is not enough simply to point to function. Someone who
has a single tooth cavity or a brief breakout of acne has a body that
is not functioning ideally. But we would not necessarily call that
person unhealthy. As Christopher Boorse has suggested, "[t]o call
a condition unhealthy is at least in part to condemn it."104 Under
this normative view, healthy conditions can be defined by their
desirability, either for the individual or society.105 We
consequently acknowledge that definitions of health are socially
constructed. 106
Consider the example of infertility. 10 7 That condition involves
difficulty reproducing. Thus, a person of child-bearing age
diagnosed with infertility would seem to be unhealthy under the
functionalist definition. Normatively, however, it is not apparent
whether that status is desirable or undesirable until we consider
the affected individual's subjective preferences.108  Under a
normativist definition of health, infertility would not be considered
1oo See, e.g., Katskee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Nebraska, 515 N.W.2d 645, 649-51
(Neb. 1994) (defining "bodily disorder or disease" as "a deviation from the healthy or normal
state affecting the functions or tissues of the body").
01 See Boorse, supra note 98, at 57-58 (discussing the Platonic account of health).
102 See id. at 57 (stating that the principle behind the Platonic account is that "the normal
is the natural... insofar as [an organism's] mode of functioning conforms to the natural
design of that kind of organism').
103 Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 1978
(2013).
014 Boorse, supra note 98, at 50.
105 Id. at 51.
106 See id. (noting that "society is the final authority on what counts as disease").




WHAT IS (AND ISN'T) HEAL THISM?
unhealthy until the infertile person wants to reproduce. 10 9 But the
normative definition has two parts: undesirable to the individual
or to society. Therefore, even conditions that may not be
subjectively undesirable to the affected individual-for example,
obesity or anorexia-may be defined as unhealthy because they
are undesirable to society.
But even those refinements do not get us all the way to a
workable definition of health. Consider again the example of acne.
Descriptively, the condition involves biological malfunction of the
pores of the skin. 110 Normatively, most people would likely prefer
not to suffer from acne. Nevertheless, many might not consider an
acne-sufferer to meet the common understanding of "unhealthy."
Thus, we should add a severity factor: to be deemed unhealthy, a
condition must be sufficiently grave, debilitating, or
incapacitating."1 For our purposes then, unhealthy means a
condition-usually based on a functional limitation of a certain
level of severity-that is considered undesirable by the individual
or by society.1 12
With that definition of unhealthy established, we can insert the
term into our working definition of healthism: systematic
differential treatment of unhealthy individuals-individuals who
109 See id. ("[T]he corollary... will be that writers of medical texts must do an empirical
survey of human preferences to be sure that a condition is a disease.").
110 See Questions and Answers About Acne, NAT'L INST. OF ARTHRITIS &
MUSCULOSKELETAL & SKIN DISEASES (Nov. 2015), http://www.niams.nih.gov/health-info/
acne/ ("Acne is a disorder resulting from the action of hormones and other substances on the
skin's oil glands.., and hair follicles.").
M See Boorse, supra note 98, at 56-57 (distinguishing "disease" and "illness" by referring
to disease as the normative description, referring to deviation from the biological norm,
while referring to illness is a "reasonably serious disease with incapacitating effects that
make it undesirable"). Mary Crossley also notes that discrimination against the unhealthy
in health insurance requires a similar degree of severity. Crossley, supra note 54, at 75 n.9.
Crossley defines the "unhealthy" as "those persons whose health status renders them heavy
users of (and thus heavy spenders on) health-care services." Id. The term encompasses the
chronically sick, those suffering accidents or acute illnesses requiring hospitalization, as
well as those requiring expensive screening and preventive treatment to avoid becoming
sick. Id. Individuals with one or more chronic conditions requiring medical care and
pharmaceutical intervention are "exemplar" members of the group. Id.
112 For more examples, see Boorse, supra note 98, at 52.
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have a sufficiently severe condition that they or society deem
undesirable-in a way that inflicts a normative wrong. The
following subsections grapple with the normative-wrong and trait-
versus-conduct elements of the healthism definition.
2. Normative Wrong. In her previous work, Roberts fails to
answer whether healthist practices constitute their own
independent normative wrong. In the health insurance context,
co-author Elizabeth Weeks Leonard expressly pushed back on the
assumption that health-status underwriting is necessarily a bad
thing, for many of the reasons we flagged above.11 3
Concluding that lifestyle discrimination, at least with respect to
nicotine use and obesity, is normatively wrong primarily because it
has a disparate impact on historically disadvantaged populations,
does not require Roberts to recognize a new protected category for
the unhealthy. From this perspective, healthism is simply a new
form of discrimination against already protected (to varying
degrees of scrutiny) groups. She does not actually have to decide
whether health-status discrimination independently constitutes a
normative wrong. Instead, she can operate from the presumption
that racial, ethnic, and other types of discrimination are wrong
and then add workplace policies against hiring nicotine users and
overweight individuals to the list of ways that discrimination
occurs.
We now consider that unanswered normative question more
carefully, applying the two antidiscrimination paradigms outlined
above. We find that the antisubordination view applies rather
neatly to Roberts's earlier examples. But even that approach
raises concerns. We could conceive of the unhealthy as a
historically oppressed group, relegated to a secondary social status
with respect to access to health insurance. To be sure, health
insurers since the dawn of that market have treated people with
identified health conditions, or potential health risks, less
113 See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Healthism, Health Care Rights, and the
Affordable Care Act, JOTWELL (July 1, 2013), http://health.jotwell.com/healthism-health-ca
re-rights-and-the-affordable-care-act/ (commenting on Roberts's critical review of the
antidiscrimination approach to health insurance and health-care reform).
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favorably than healthy applicants and subscribers. 114  GINA,
HIPAA, and the ACA are all laws that seek to reform the private
health insurance market to correct that subordination. 115 Similar
to the language of race discrimination, the political rhetoric
around the ACA's enactment suggests that its framers envisioned
themselves precisely in that role-remedying a longstanding
history of unfair discriminatory insurance practices against the
unhealthy.1 6 In the employment context, modern iterations of
lifestyle discrimination is a relatively recent form of subordination
compared to insurance underwriting and ratemaking, as well as
more traditional forms of health-status discrimination in
employment. 117  Nevertheless, existing state laws that prohibit
such lifestyle discrimination by employers effectively prohibit
employers from disadvantaging the overweight and nicotine users,
consistent with an antisubordination paradigm. 118 Beyond obesity
and tobacco/nicotine use, the antisubordination view provides a
less clear rationale for our larger project of recognizing healthism
across the spectrum. It is not evident that the unhealthy, across
the board, have historically and systematically faced negative
differential treatment.
Other traditional frameworks for discrimination law,
specifically anticlassification and immutability, provide incomplete
normative rationales as well, as already considered above.
Anticlassification excludes disparate impact discrimination and
disallows positive treatment of historically disadvantaged
groups. 119 Our project will examine both of those types of laws.
Immutability theory fails to capture health-status related conduct,
14 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
116 Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1175-77, 1187 (describing the antidiscrimination
rhetoric surrounding the ACA).
117 Employers have taken an interest in employer health for almost a century. See
Henderson, supra note 75 (describing the company towns of the nineteenth century).
118 See, e.g., Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 608-09 (describing Minnesota's
lifestyle discrimination statute, which protects employees who seek to lawfully use tobacco
and consume alcoholic beverages and food during non-working hours).
119 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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which we expressly include. The following Subpart more fully
interrogates that element of the healthism definition.
3. Trait vs. Conduct. An additional challenge in applying
Roberts's previous definitions is her inclusion of health-related
conduct. To be sure, including health-related conduct was
essential for Roberts's writing on workplace healthism because her
objective was to point out the shortcomings of existing federal laws
to protect employee lifestyle choices. 120 As mentioned, a number of
federal laws prohibit discrimination based on health status or trait
in either health insurance, employment, or both. 121 But no current
federal law protects workers from discrimination based on health-
related conduct, activities, or habits, the problem that Roberts
sought to address.122
As Roberts has noted, disability discrimination laws already
prohibit discrimination on the basis of several different health
conditions under certain circumstances. Title I of the ADA, for
instance, prohibits employment discrimination based on present,
past, and perceived impairments. 123 Roberts asserts that once one
acquires the status of having a legally recognized disability,
having the disability becomes a characteristic of that person.124 It
becomes a health-related trait.125 She explains that while the law
might provide protection once a person acquires the disability (for
120 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 607 ("Current federal employment
discrimination statutes do not proscribe employment decisions based on unhealthy
conduct.").
121 See id. at 594-604 (applying the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, GINA, HIPAA, and the
ACA to healthism).
122 See id. at 604 ("Because existing federal employment discrimination laws protect an
individual from discrimination on the basis of her health status insofar as it relates to
certain traits, yet not insofar as it relates to conduct, those statutes offer incomplete
protection at best.").
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (defining disability as a physical or mental
impairment, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an
impairment).
'2 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 604-07 (describing how, once acquired, the
status of a disability is "fixed," in that no further conduct is necessary to maintain it).
125 See id. (defining "traits" as static characteristics that "do not necessitate further
conduct to maintain").
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example, diabetes), it will not protect the unhealthy conduct that
caused the condition (a sedentary lifestyle). 126
Drug and alcohol use provide another useful example. The use
of those substances is surely conduct. But liver disease, hepatitis,
depression, or other conditions caused by substance abuse are
traits or conditions. Furthermore, the ADA covers drug and
alcohol addiction under certain circumstances. 127 Here, Roberts
would argue that the ADA protects the trait of addiction but not
the conduct of drug or alcohol use. In fact, the statute itself
attempts to draw a similar line: it prohibits discrimination on the
basis of an addiction to illegal drugs (trait), yet allows employers
to fire employees who currently use illegal drugs (conduct).128
Moreover, obesity does not neatly fit the trait-condition
dichotomy. To the extent that obesity is the result of individual
eating and exercise habits, it seems to be a conduct-based health
status, which can be altered by changes in individual behavior.
Roberts acknowledges that an individual's weight may require
longer-term conduct to change than a smoker's simply ceasing to
smoke. 129 Nevertheless, she considers obesity a conduct-based,
rather than a trait-based, health status.130 Following her
126 See id. at 605 (explaining that existing statutes "protect on the basis of specific traits,
not conduct").
IV See GARY S. MARx, 1 DIsABILITY LAW COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 6:1 (2015) (stating that
"[ijndividuals who are addicted to drugs, but who are no longer using drugs illegally and
who are receiving treatment for drug addiction or who have been rehabilitated successfully,
are protected by the ADA from discrimination on the basis of past drug addiction" and that
"[a]n alcoholic is an individual with a disability who is protected by the ADA and, therefore,
may be entitled to reasonable accommodation if he or she is qualified to perform the
essential functions of a job'). But see Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that alcoholism can be an impairment but not a per se disability).
128 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (2012) ("[A] qualified individual with a disability shall
not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs,
when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use." (emphasis added)), with id.
§ 12114(b) (prohibiting discrimination against former drug users who have undergone
rehabilitation).
129 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 605 ("[S]omeone 'becomes' a nonsmoker at
the moment she has her final cigarette. On the contrary, a person does not stop being obese
at the moment she decides to make eating or lifestyle changes.').
130 See id. (asserting that one's weight is not a fixed trait, but rather based on dynamic
conduct).
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reasoning for smokers and cancer, one presumes that conditions
such as coronary artery disease and diabetes, which may coincide
with obesity, are trait-based statuses, even though a patient surely
may be able to improve blood flow to the heart or reduce symptoms
of diabetes through diet, exercise, and other lifestyle changes. 131
The line between trait and condition, here and elsewhere, is
unavoidably blurry. In any case, drawing that distinction does not
seem to get us closer to defining healthism in a global cross-
contextual way, beyond the particular legislative contexts that
Roberts's earlier work considered.
The attempt to distinguish between trait-based and conduct-
based health statuses becomes even more fraught in light of the
widely accepted view that individual behaviors and lifestyles
impact health status.132 That is, health is hugely impacted by
conduct and choices about how we live. Robert Veatch suggests
that the "medical model," which attributes disease to "organic
causal chains almost totally outside human control," or "external
and uncontrollable causation," is hardly defensible under modern
science. 133 He states, "We may not be far from the day when we
can say that all health problems can be viewed as someone's
fault."134  The relevance of those insights for our definitional
project is to recognize that very few, if any, health statuses are
truly free of a conduct-based component.
131 See How to Prevent and Control Coronary Heart Disease Risk Factors, NAT'L HEART,
LUNG & BLOOD INST. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/
hdlprevent (listing healthy eating and physical activity among the lifestyle changes that can
lower blood pressure, help control diabetes, and prevent heart disease).
132 See Amy Darby, The Individual, Health Hazardous Lifestyles, Disease and Liability, 2
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 787, 799 (1999) ("Undoubtedly, there is strong support for the
idea that behaviors and lifestyles impact health."). See generally Robert M. Veatch,
Voluntary Risks to Health: The Ethical Issues, 243 JAMA 50 (1980) (discussing the
increasing data showing a correlation between lifestyle and health status).
'M See Veatch, supra note 132, at 51 (noting how the medical model is no longer credible
in light of recent research).
'34 Id. at 52. Both Veatch and Amy Darby cite Belloc and Breslow's study, which
demonstrated improved health by abiding by seven relatively simple health habits. Id. at
50; Darby, supra note 132, at 800.
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While Roberts identified a meaningful trend, in the modern
concept of healthism, her previous writing did not include a clear
definition of what it means to discriminate on the basis of health
status. Specifically, she did not address when differentiation on
the basis of health status is independently harmful enough to
warrant legal intervention, or when and how health-based
decisionmaking is appropriate and should, therefore, not be
considered discriminatory. Part III therefore turns to the
unexplored territory of situations when differential treatment on
the basis of health status is economically desirable or socially
beneficial.
III. QUESTIONING HEALTHISM
As a general matter, antidiscrimination law forbids
governmental and, in some cases, private actors from treating
individuals differently on the basis of forbidden characteristics. 1 35
The prohibition is not absolute, however. The law recognizes that
there may be legitimate, legally permissible bases for such
differentiation in certain contexts. 136 The exceptions for allowable
discrimination based on gender, age, disability, or other well-
established protected categories are quite narrow. 137 One of the
challenges of this project is that the exceptions to healthism are
relatively broad.138 The range of socially acceptable reasons for
differentiation based on health status is more extensive than for
other, already established protected categories. Nevertheless, we
135 Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1178.
136 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 151 (illustrating how discrimination in certain contexts
is not considered wrong even when based on immutable traits).
137 See id. at 204 & n.80 (noting, as an example from the employment context, how
employers may use religion, sex, or national origin as a factor in their hiring decisions only
in those narrow instances where such characteristics are "bona fide occupational
qualification[s] reasonably necessary" to the enterprise's normal operation (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988))).
138 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 594 (noting that although certain health-
related employment statutes prohibit discrimination based on health-related traits,




maintain, as our central thesis, that there are some forms of
normatively wrong health-status discrimination for which existing
laws do not provide adequate legal protection.
This Part of our Article explores the situations in which there
are legitimate reasons for differentiating on the basis of health
status. Thus, we now question which practices or laws satisfy the
normative-wrong portion of Roberts's working definition of
healthism. Specifically, we consider situations in which
distinguishing on the basis of health status is not only
economically rational but also socially beneficial. From that point,
we can define a roadmap for policymaking that promotes health
without unfairly discriminating. Intellectual honesty requires us
to appreciate that our good health-status differentiation versus
bad healthism divide is anything but black and white.
A. WELFARISM
We first consider the possibility of rational reasons for treating
people differently, even on the basis of immutable health
characteristics. Our approach, outlined in Part IV, would
sometimes allow negative differential treatment when the result
produces a net positive outcome for the individual and for
society. 13 9  In other words, we acknowledge that some
differentiations on the basis of health status can be welfare-
enhancing. As the foregoing discussion has highlighted, for ages,
employers and insurers have identified economically rational
reasons for treating the unhealthy differently from the healthy.
The task of our larger project, then, is to identify which of those
cases should be forbidden as healthism and which should be
permitted as neutral or even desirable health-status
differentiations.
By way of example, first consider a truck driver with a severe
visual impairment. Few would seriously argue that an employer
who refuses to hire an extremely visually impaired person to drive
139 This position is, of course, classic utilitarian policy-making: "[it is the greatest
happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong." JEREMY
BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 94 (F.C. Montague ed., 1891).
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a delivery truck has committed a normative wrong. 140
Antidiscrimination law recognizes that similarly situated
individuals should not be treated differently without adequate
justification. 141 But if the discrimination is relevant to the job
qualification for driving a truck, there is nothing unfair or
wrongful about it. Thus, employment discrimination law builds in
what can be described as safety and efficiency exceptions, such as
qualification and job-relatedness requirements, BFOQs, and the
direct threat defense. 142
1. Cost-Effectiveness in Health Insurance. Next, we consider
Roberts's previous examples of insurance and employment. The
reasons for insurers' discrimination on the basis of health status
are longstanding and well-identified, including essential concepts
of insurable risk, actuarial fairness, and moral hazard. 143
Moreover, classically, insurance is not available for losses
resulting from conduct that is fully within the insured's control,
such as intentional torts or suicide. 144 As a matter of actuarial
140 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 151 (stating that generally, "we... know it is not wrong
to refuse to hire the blind as truck drivers"). Of course, even this example may become more
complicated with the development of computer-assisted or automated vehicles, as those
technologies could operate as reasonable accommodations for the disabled driver. See, e.g.,
Look, No Hands, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/
21576224-one-day-every-car-may-come-invisible-chauffeur-look-no-hands (discussing the
development of driverless cars). But, for now, the example is illustrative for our purposes.
141 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 344 (1949).
142 For an individual with a disability to sue for discrimination, the ADA requires that the
person be "qualified," meaning able to perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8) (2012). The ADA also contains an explicit statutory defense for qualifications
standards that screen out individuals with disabilities but are job-related and consistent
with business necessity or preclude an individual from posing a direct threat. Id.
§ 12113(a)-(b). Title VII provides that an employer can make employment-related decisions
on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)
(2012).
43 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 606-07.
144 See Wackwitz v. Roy, 244 Va. 60, 64 (1992) ("It is well settled that, as a general rule, 'a
party who consents to and participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages
from other participants for the consequence of that act.' ").
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fairness, individuals at higher risk of poor health should pay more
for their insurance.
Without a doubt, health status is highly relevant to health
insurers' decisions about offering and pricing health insurance.
Accordingly, insurers' seemingly "healthist" practices are entirely
economically rational-as long as one understands the insurance
product in the classic sense of actuarial fairness. In that view,
there is nothing unfair or normatively wrong about treating people
differently based on health status for purposes of underwriting
and ratemaking. 145 From the insurance company's perspective, it
would no more insure someone already diagnosed with cancer than
the trucking company would hire the visually impaired driver.
Moreover, health insurance typically imposes cost-sharing
obligations (copayments, deductibles, and coinsurance), and
managed care includes gatekeeping by third-party
administrators. 146 Those strategies guard against moral hazard,
which is the tendency of insured individuals to use more medical
care than those who pay out-of-pocket.1 47 Cost-sharing requires
patients to internalize at least a portion of the cost of the care they
are requesting, while gatekeeping inserts another third-party
rational actor into the decisionmaking. 148 But those strategies also
disadvantage the unhealthy by making health care more expensive
145 See generally Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6.
146 See Cost Sharing, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/cost-sharing/
(last visited May 30, 2016) (defining "cost sharing" as "the share of costs covered by your
insurance that you pay for out of your own pocket" and including deductibles, coinsurance,
and copayments in the list of forms of cost sharing); Managed Care Terms, ACAD. OF
MANAGED CARE PHARM., http://www.amcp.org/ManagedCareTerms/ (last visited June 28,
2016) (stating that most managed care organizations rely primarily on a "gatekeeper" to
screen patients seeking medical care and to eliminate costly referral to specialists for
diagnosis).
141 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 606-07.
148 See Cost Sharing, supra note 146 (identifying that insureds must pay a certain portion
of their medical costs out of their own pocket); Managed Care Terms, supra note 146
(describing the role of the gatekeeper in reducing costs).
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and harder to access. 149 Roberts has thus proposed that health
insurance-while economically rational-is also healthist.150
The ACA and other laws that prohibit consideration of health
status in health insurance do not deny the relevance of that
classification. Instead, the laws express a policy judgment and
embrace a different conception of insurance in which restrictions
on or denial of access to health insurance on the basis of health
status is wrongful. The ACA represents a fundamental shift from
an actuarial model to a mutual aid, or social solidarity, model of
health insurance. 151 That view does not reject the relevance of
health status, but instead says that it cannot be considered, except
in certain limited instances.152
2. Cost-Effectiveness in Employment. Although mostly a matter
of historical accident prompted by favorable tax treatment to
employee benefit expenditures, health insurance and employment
in the United States are inextricably linked. 153  Once one
recognizes that employers pay for a large percentage of health-care
costs, economic reasons for employers considering the health
status of their employees become readily apparent. A group of
employees under one employer's group plan constitutes a single
risk pool. 15 4 The employer negotiates an insurance plan with
149 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 580 ("At least two kinds of cost-based concerns
may drive employers to avoid hiring employees considered unhealthy: (1) higher health-
insurance rates and premiums; and (2) productivity and safety concerns.").
150 Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1175.
151 One of the authors has described this shift as the ACA's universality principle. See
Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (discussing the ACA's reversal of the norm in American health care from
the exclusion principle to the universality principle for health care). See generally Nicole
Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as Social Insurance,
46 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 545 (2015); Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Medicaid
Expansion as Completion of the Great Society, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 1.
152 Save select categories-tobacco usage, age, and geographic location in the individual
market and wellness program participation. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1) (2012).
153 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Ron Wyden, Why Tie Health Insurance to a Job?, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 10, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/SB122887085038593345 (describing
the history of health insurance's connection to employment and stating that "employers didn't
start offering health benefits.., because they were experts in medical decisions").
154 See Managed Care Terms, supra note 146 (defining "risk pool" as a "defined
account.., to which revenue and expenses are posted," which "attempts to define expected
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potential subscribers, bringing the entire group risk profile to the
table. 155 Typically, the employer and the employees split the cost
of the negotiated price for the plan, with families paying higher
premiums than individuals. 156 Under HIPAA, all employees in a
group plan pay the same premiums, regardless of individual
health status.157 That limited community rating requirement
means that lower-risk employees subsidize higher-risk employees.
Given those dynamics, both employers, who pay for the overall
plan, as well as employees, who pay their own share of premiums
based on the community rate, have a strong interest in their co-
workers health status.
It is cost-effective, then, to try to keep unhealthy or high-risk
workers out of the pool altogether by firing them, refusing to hire
them, or trying to lower their risks by otherwise incentivizing
them to be healthier. 158 In other words, there are sound economic
reasons for employers' apparently healthist employment practices,
including lifestyle discrimination on the basis of tobacco/nicotine
use and obesity. In addition to the impact on health insurance
costs, unhealthy employees may be seen as presenting higher risks
of absenteeism, lower productivity, and increased liability for
workplace injuries. 5 9  Given these economically rational
claim liabilities of a given defined account as well as required funding to support the claim
liability").
155 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON CHALLENGES TO THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (Nov. 14, 2001),
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC 11l4bOlreport.html (testimony of Christine
Paige) ("Employers have more leverage in negotiating discounts on the premiums than
individuals on their own.").
' See Small Business Majority, Cost-Sharing, HEALTHCOVERAGEGUIDE.ORG, http://health
coverageguide.org/reference-guide/benefits-providers-and-costs/cost-sharing (last visited May
31, 2016) (describing how employers and employees split the cost of employer-sponsored
health insurance).
157 FAQs About Portability of Health Coverage and HIPAA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC.
ADMIN., U.S DEP"t OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faqconsumer hipaa.html (last
visited May 31, 2016).
158 See Jessica L. Roberts, An Alternate Theory of Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 22 CONN. INS.
L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (identifying why employers may find it desirable to deny benefits to
unhealthy, and therefore more expensive, employees).
15 Henderson, supra note 74, at 1517 ("[Flirms bear some of the costs of individuals
smoking (including higher health insurance costs, lower productivity, increased
absenteeism, and so on).").
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considerations, to the extent that Roberts characterizes lifestyle
discrimination based on certain discrete health-related conduct as
normatively wrong, it must be on other policy grounds. 160 For her
purposes, she concludes that nicotine- and obesity-related
employment practices tend to perpetuate existing racial, ethnic,
and other types of discrimination. 16' But, again, that conclusion
does not require her to actually recognize healthism as a new type
of discrimination, but rather, a new way of discriminating against
already recognized protected categories.
3. Cost-Effectiveness in Other Contexts. The existence of
economically rational grounds for treating the unhealthy
differently from the healthy is even more apparent as we move
outside of the insurance and employment contexts. For example,
the common law of torts may disallow or reduce recovery to
plaintiffs who are partially responsible for their own injuries by
engaging in health-risky conduct, including smoking, skydiving,
racecar driving, and non-seatbelt wearing.162 The doctrine of
mitigation of damages also has the potential to inject healthist
considerations by penalizing patients for failing to take post-injury
steps to reduce the severity of injuries.163 To the extent that tort
law judgments create incentives for individuals to alter their
behavior 64 (and we recognize a considerable body of scholarship
concluding that it does not' 65), those rules may likewise be
rational.
160 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 625 ("Health-related employment policies
could-perhaps counter-intuitively--generate a healthier workforce but at least healthy
total population.').
'' Id. at 626.
1r2 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 15-16 (1987) (describing
comparative negligence).
163 Id. at 144-46 (describing mitigation of damages).
164 For classical formulations of the economic analysis of tort law, see generally GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A- POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); A-
MITCHELL POL1NSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw & ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2003); SHAVELL,
supra note 162.
616 See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysie of Tort Law; Doce Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-82 & nn.17-26 (1994) (citing those who have
challenged the notion of tort law's capacity for deterrence); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing
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Similarly, under a neoclassical economic approach to contract
law, individuals are free to enter, refuse to enter, or tailor the
terms of contracts with anyone they choose. 166  An airline's
decision to charge a significantly overweight passenger for two
seats is surely economically rational, as the airline can no longer
sell the extra seat to another passenger. Likewise, physicians
have no legal obligation to treat any particular patient, absent
statutory or contractual restrictions on freedom of contract.
Accordingly, they may conclude that a difficult, noncompliant,
uncooperative, hopeless, or uninsured patient is not worth their
time and effort to treat and, on that basis, may terminate the
treatment relationship or refuse to enter a physician-patient
contract at all. 167 But, as a society, we nevertheless may want to
deem such practices normatively wrong-i.e., discriminatory.
B. SOCIAL BENEFITS OF PATERNALISM
In addition to acknowledging the economically rational reasons
for disfavoring the unhealthy, we further observe that
differentiation on the basis of health status may be desirable
because it can improve individuals' lives and society as a whole.
When a law or policy intervenes to an individual's benefit, yet
against her will, it is considered paternalistic. 16 Paternalism, as
defined in philosophy, has three key elements: it refers to an
action that (1) intentionally constrains the liberty or autonomy of
another individual (2) without her consent (3) for the purpose of
Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 664 (1985) ("Tort law is failing... to promote
better conduct."); Zenon Zabinski & Bernard S. Black, The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law:
Evidence from Medical Malpractice Reform (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13-09, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2161362 ("Med mal reform is good for
healthcare providers-but the case for overall social benefit is hard to make.").
166 See Daniel A- Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
303, 305 (1983) (emphasizing freedom of contract in the neoclassical approach, stating that
"[f]rom a neoclassical economic perspective, most restrictions on freedom of contract make
very little sense").
167 See generally Jessica Mantel & Jessica L. Roberts, You're Fired! Restricting Physicians'
Ability to Reject Noncompliant Patients (in progress).
'68 Lindsay J. Thompson, Paternalism, in ENCYCL. Bus. ETHICS & SOC'Y 1 (Robert W. Kolb
ed., 2008) ("Paternalism is commonly understood as an infringement on the personal
freedom and autonomy of a person... with a beneficent or protective intent.").
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helping her (either by protecting her from harm or by providing
her with an otherwise unavailable benefit).169 Thus, paternalism
has both an act and a mindset requirement. For a policy to be
paternalistic, it cannot simply restrict freedom non-consensually;
it must do so with the particular goal of aiding the restricted
person. 170
Despite its roots in beneficence, the word paternalism gets a
bad rap. 171 Historically, it has been associated with the oppression
of politically disempowered groups, specifically women and people
with disabilities. 172 Today, it is most frequently invoked as a
concern that institutions unjustifiably restrict freedom, treating
full-grown adults like children incapable of independent
decisionmaking. 173 This framing explains the term "nannyism"'174
and popular rhetoric decrying the rise of the "nanny state." 75
Paternalism, however, may not be all bad. 76  First, people
'9 Id. at 2; see also Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCL. PHIL. (2014).
170 Thompson, supra note 168, at 3 ("Moral arguments for paternalism must offer
compelling reasons to justify the restriction of freedom.").
171 Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Peter H. Huang, Positive Parentalism, 31 NAT'L L.J. 27, 27
(2009) (calling paternalism "a dirty word"); Thompson, supra note 168, at 1 (explaining that
"[t]he discursive use of the term paternalism is almost exclusively negative").
172 Both the feminist and the disability rights movements have rejected paternalism. In
Frontiero v. Richardson, Justice Brennan explained that "[t]raditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical
effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). To establish
its anti-paternalism position, the International Disability Caucus adopted the slogan
"Nothing about Us, Without Us." 'Nothing about Us, Without Us": International Day of
Disabled Persons 2004, UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/idd
p2004.htm (last visited May 31, 2016).
173 Thompson, supra note 168, at 3 ("Paternalism denies the full humanity of individuals
by failing to respect their capabilities for acting in their own best interest.").
174 See Blumenthal & Huang, supra note 171, at 1 (noting several negative terms
associated with paternalism, including the "nanny state").
176 See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of
Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2014) (explaining New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg's nickname, "Nanny Bloomberg," due to his paternalistic policies); Lindsay F.
Wiley et al., Who's Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of
Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 88-89 (2013) (briefly exploring "the
forces behind the cultural and political resonance of concerns about public health
paternalism, 'personal responsibility,' and the 'nanny state").
176 See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (1998)
(rejecting critics of paternalism).
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frequently make choices that undermine their long-term well-
being. 177 Second, research indicates that individuals may actually
dislike making choices and would rather defer or delegate their
decisionmaking. 178  Those findings challenge the notion that
freedom of choice is always preferable to certain kinds of
paternalism. 179
Importantly, paternalism can generate a net positive, even
under neoclassical utilitarian analysis. Paternalistic interventions
"may help people save money, live safer, be healthier, and make
better decisions for themselves."'80 Thus, if people value the
positive outcomes of the paternalistic intervention more than they
dislike the limitation on their autonomy, the welfare increase
generated through the paternalism exceeds the welfare reduction
that results from the individuals' distaste for it. 181
Roberts's prior work acknowledges the positive effects of
paternalism as one potential justification for health-status
differentiation. 8 2  She notes that employees subjected to an
intensive employer-sponsored wellness program experienced
"positive health-related outcomes, such as quitting smoking and
losing significant amounts of weight." 18 3  If the smokers or
overweight individuals subjected to the paternalistic nudge of
workplace wellness programs experience no substantial costs, and
perhaps even garner a benefit, that differentiation may not
generate a normative wrong.1l 4  Thus, although workplace
177 Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 405,
422 (2010) ("[I]ndividuals' choices in many realms, and safety, clearly show nonoptimal
decision making about their own welfare.").
178 Id. (noting that "people often prefer not to make decisions").
179 Id. (suggesting that "critics of the empirical case for paternalism have a higher burden
to overcome than has been traditionally assumed").
18 Blumenthal & Huang, supra note 171, at 1.
181 Zamir, supra note 176, at 233 (explaining that "an act or a rule is efficient if the sum of
the well-being (utility) it generates is greater than the sum of its costs (disutility)").
182 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 623-24 (outlining the benefits of paternalism).
183 Id. at 624.
184 Some antidiscrimination scholars might challenge whether any sort of differentiation
could exist without creating preferences or hierarchy. See Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan,
Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 367-68 (2001) (noting that the first stage in
stigma formation is acknowledging differences). This question is one of philosophy, and we
do not seek to resolve it here.
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wellness programs may create health-based differentiation, they
would not necessarily all be-at least by Roberts's previous
definition-healthist.
But suppose that the smokers or overweight employees do
experience a disadvantage, such as lack of access to a particular
benefit or higher insurance premiums, and that disadvantage-the
"stick"--eventually leads them to stop using nicotine or to lose
weight. In that case, it is still possible that the potential benefits
of the paternalistic intervention would outweigh the costs
associated with the healthist action, making the differentiation
justifiable to serve the greater (and indeed, individual) good. As a
result, we do not want to be too quick to dismiss paternalistic
policies as categorically undesirable. To fully consider the
possibility that paternalistic laws and policies may be socially
desirable, it is necessary to consider paternalism theory more
carefully. Scholars have identified a number of conceptual dyads,
which operate differently within our normative project. This
Section situates our normative project within paternalism theory.
1. Sources of Paternalism. The first distinction within the
paternalism literature relates to the entity imposing the
intervention. We take a broad view, considering actions by both
governmental and private actors. A narrow construction of
paternalism applies to coercive action on the part of the state only,
whereas a broad construction covers paternalism by states,
institutions, and even individuals. 185 Thus, according to narrow
paternalism, a state law banning smoking in enclosed spaces
would be paternalistic, whereas an employer's ban on smoking at
work would not. Conversely, broad paternalism would cover not
only the state's and the employer's non-smoking policies, but also a
spouse's decision to throw away her partner's stash of cigarettes.
Because our project is to examine the potential for healthism
across a range of contexts, we take the broad view. This approach
is consistent with Roberts's earlier work in the health insurance
185 Paternalism, supra note 168 ("A broad paternalist is concerned with any paternalistic
action: state institutional (hospital policy, or individual."); see also Thompson, supra note
168, at 2 (discussing differences between broad and narrow paternalism).
2016]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
and employment contexts, which necessarily included policies
imposed by private actors-namely insurance companies and
private employers.186
The difference between broad and narrow paternalism does not
directly advance our project of divining socially desirable versus
undesirable health distinctions. Our analysis turns not on the
identity of the actor engaged in paternalistic conduct, but rather
on the outcome of the policy, practice, or law that treats the
unhealthy paternalistically. The identity of the individual or
entity acting paternalistically may matter, however, in deciding
which conduct is normatively good. For example, a law prohibiting
an employer from acting paternalistically might be justified in
certain contexts, whereas a law forbidding a family member from
the same or similar conduct would not be. Similarly, it may be
harder to justify allowing the government, which has much greater
coercive power and broader reach, to restrict individual choices,
compared to similar restriction implemented by a private party.
For example, if a single natural food store elects not to sell
products containing trans-fats because it believes those foods are
not good for its customers, that paternalistic policy may be more
acceptable than a city-wide ordinance forbidding such products in
any store or restaurant.
2. Objects of Paternalism. Another paternalism distinction
considers the method by which the individual's liberty or
autonomy is restricted in the name of health, safety, or harm
prevention. Scholars distinguish between pure and impure
paternalism. In pure paternalism, the paternalistic action is
directed at the same group whose welfare is being safeguarded or
promoted.18 7  For example, banning people from smoking e-
186 See generally Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6; Roberts, Employment, supra note 6
(discussing policies of private actors in insurance and equipment contexts).
18? See Paternalism, supra note 168 ("In pure paternalism the class being protected is
identical with the class being interfered with, e.g.L] preventing swimmers from swimming
when lifeguards are not present.'); see also Thompson, supra note 168, at 2 ("Pure
paternalism would restrict the actions of people who may be harmed by their own
behavior....").
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cigarettes or similar products (vaping) is pure paternalism.18
Impure paternalism instead targets third-party conduct to protect
potential victims of that conduct.189 Thus, banning the
manufacture of e-cigarettes because they could be harmful to
consumers of those products would be an impure paternalistic
intervention. Impure paternalism restricts the liberty of not only
current or would-be "vapers," but also the companies that
manufacture vaping products. Accordingly, one might be more
cautious about advocating impure forms of paternalism, even
though impure forms may be more effective.
3. Objectives of Paternalism. Philosophers also distinguish
between the type of good that the entity engaging in the
paternalistic activity is attempting to promote. 19 Our project is
most clearly concerned with physical paternalism, but we
recognize that some interventions may also produce moral
benefits.1 91 Physical paternalism centers on the physical or mental
well-being of the targeted individuals. 92  Moral paternalism
targets an individual's moral welfare by protecting her from
intangible harms like corruption or degradation or by encouraging
her to engage in morally upright behavior. 193
Health-oriented regulation generally aims to produce
physiological or psychological goods, but in some cases, it may also
produce moral goods. For example, certain ascetic religions,
including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, practice abstention
,88 See Paternalism, supra note 168 (illustrating pure and impure paternalism in the
context of smoking bans versus cigarette manufacturing bans).
'8 See Thompson, supra note 168, at 2 ("[1]mpure paternalism would restrict the actions
of third parties to protect potential victims."); see also Paternalism, supra note 168 ("In the
case of impure paternaliom the claoo of porcono interfered with iB larger than the cla3D
being protected.').
190 See Paternalism, supra note 168 (identifying this distinction as "moral vs. welfare
paternalism').
191 See id. (noting that some paternalism attempts to "make a person's life go better,"
whereas other paternalistic intervention aims to "protect the moral welfare of the person').
in Joel Feinberg, Paternalism, in ENCYCL. PHIL. 390 (Donald M. Borchert ed., 1996);
Paternalism, supra note 168.




from certain worldly pleasures. 194 Adherents may follow a strict
vegetarian diet that also excludes certain vegetables, refined
sugar, and various other foods containing undesirable
properties. 195 Thus, a policy that encourages healthy eating and
abstinence might simultaneously reduce a person's blood pressure
and save her from morally undesirable food or alcohol
consumption. 96 Accordingly, laws or policies that prohibit or
restrict those substances in the name of health may also arguably
promote the moral standing of the objects of those paternalistic
policies under some belief systems.
The connection between health and morality, however, is not
the primary aim of our project. We merely seek to delineate
between socially undesirable and socially desirable health-status
differentiation. But to the extent that health broadly encompasses
both physical and mental well-being, we acknowledge that
paternalistic policies can help individuals achieve their own moral
aims or avoid degradation of the self.
4. Approaches to Paternalism. Among the various sources,
objects, and objectives of paternalism, there are also differing
approaches to coercing individuals' choices and behavior. A policy,
practice, or law may simply prohibit certain unhealthy behaviors
or products, or may try to nudge individuals to make healthier
choices for themselves. The approach might meet individuals
where they are, reinforcing their own identified goals, or might try
to reshape their desires or to correct their misapprehensions. By
singling out unhealthy individuals or behaviors for intervention,
all of these laws or policies are arguably healthist. Our larger
project aims to tease out the good and the bad, recognizing that
various approaches to paternalism may have salutary effects.
194 Asceticism, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/ asceticism (last
visited May 31, 2016).
195 See, e.g., GEORGE WATT, A DICTIONARY OF THE ECONOMIC PRODUCTS OF INDIA 324
(W.H. Allen & Co., 1893) (describing a resistance to "European refined sugars owing to the
apprehension of animal charcoal having been used in its preparation" in Hinduism).
196 For example, Christianity may preach that the "body is the temple of the Holy Ghost,"
which therefore should not be corrupted with drugs, alcohol, tobacco, or other unhealthy
food. 1 Corinthians 6:19 (King James).
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First, paternalism comes in soft and hard varieties. Soft
paternalism advocates interfering with individuals' actions for the
purpose of giving them sufficient information to make truly
informed choices. 197 Rather than prohibiting the conduct outright,
soft paternalism attempts to encourage people to make better
choices for themselves. 198 For example, a soft paternalist would
stop an individual from using an indoor tanning booth just long
enough to explain the increased dangers of skin cancer to her. By
contrast, a hard paternalist would prohibit indoor tanning, even if
the customer is fully informed of and voluntarily assumes the
risks. 19 9
Another example of hard paternalism is the ADA's "direct
threat" defense. The direct threat defense permits employers to
forbid individuals with disabilities from assuming certain risks- of
workplace injury to themselves or their coworkers.200 The rule
operates paternalistically, in the hard sense, inasmuch as the
targeted covered disabled workers are rational adults, capable of
deciding whether their conditions present a risk of injury.201 The
direct threat defense also is arguably openly healthist in that it
permits employers to explicitly consider applicants' or employees'
197 See Paternalism, supra note 168 ("Soft paternalism is the view that the only conditions
under which state paternalism is justified io when it is necossary to determine whether the
person being interfered with is acting voluntarily and knowledgably."); see also Thompson,
supra note 168, at 2 (describing the typical principles of an advocate for soft paternalism).
19 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008) (noting that, with soft paternalism, "choices are
not blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened").
199 See Thompson, supra note 168, at 2 ("[Aln advocate of hard paternalism would permit
restrictions of liberty to prevent suicide or grave personal harm even when a person in
question is fully cognizant of his or her actions and their consequences.").
200 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) ('The direct threat
defense must be 'based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge andlor the best available objective evidence' and upon an expressly
'individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of the job,' reached after considering, among other thingo, the imminence of the
risk and the sovereignty of the harm portended." (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2001))).
201 One could construct an argument, however, that the direct threat defense is not
paternalistic because the employer could be concerned about potential legal liability, not the
welfare of any particular employee.
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disabilities and limit their activities on the basis of their
disabilities.
Certain forms of hard paternalism, which impose more deeply
on individual liberty and autonomy, may nevertheless be more
desirable than certain forms of soft paternalism. Compare torts
rules, such as assumption of the risk, mitigation of damages, and
contributory negligence. Each of those common-law doctrines may
reduce the amount that a person may recover for personal injury
based on the notion that the victim partially caused his injuries. 20 2
To the extent that tort rules operate as incentives for safety, they
constitute soft paternalism by allowing actors to continue to
voluntarily engage in risky behavior with the tradeoff being lower
(or, in some cases, no) damages if they get injured. Therefore, the
tort rule is more respectful of individual autonomy and liberty.
From the perspective of promoting individual and societal health,
however, the hard paternalistic policies may produce a greater net
positive effect than the soft paternalistic tort damages rules.20 3
Thus, from an anti-healthism perspective, we cannot conclude that
hard paternalism is necessarily bad and soft paternalism is
necessarily good.
Our more nuanced assessment will also consider both weak and
strong forms of paternalism. Weak paternalism accepts the
individual's desired ends as legitimate on their face and advocates
intervening when an individual's conduct does not serve her own
ends. 204 Strong paternalism, by contrast, recognizes that a person
may have irrational, confused, or mistaken desires and supports
= W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451-52
(5th ed. 1984).
203 See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity: Justifiability
of Strong Hard Paternalism in Public Health Regulation, 46 CONIN. L. REV. 1859 (2014)
(arguing that hard paternalism pohoieo are the moot effective regulatory measures in
reducing obesity).
201 See Paternalism, supra note 168 (explaining that a weak paternalist finds it legitimate
to interfere with means that people chooce to achieve their ends if those moans are likely to
defeat those ends); Thompson, supra note 168, at 2 (exclaiming that "weak paternalism
would consider it legitimate to use coercive means to achieve a person's desired
consequence, such as requiring seatbelts, in the assumption that people deserve life and
health and therefore should be forced to take measures to protect themoelves').
876 [Vol. 50:833
WHAT IS (AND ISN'T) HEAL THISM?
intervening to correct the underlying error or misapprehension. 20 5
For example, many people would like to lose weight. Pursuant to
weak paternalism, it would be acceptable to prevent those people
from overeating because that behavior interferes with their goal to
lose weight. Imagine instead that a person wishes to gain a
hundred pounds. Weak paternalism would accept the desire to
gain weight as legitimate and not interfere with the person's food
choices, even though that goal could be harmful. By contrast,
strong paternalism would dismiss the desire to gain a hundred
pounds as misguided and would support an intervention.
The hard/soft and strong/weak paternalism distinctions
recently have culminated in what has been dubbed "libertarian
paternalism."20 6 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein are the most
noted authors of this view.207  While traditional paternalism
intervenes directly in people's choices, libertarian paternalism
attempts to use behavioral economics and psychology to facilitate
better decisionmaking. 208 For instance, whereas a traditional
paternalist might advocate banning unhealthy foods, a libertarian
paternalist would arrange a grocery store or restaurant menu in
such a way that encourages patrons either to avoid unhealthy
foods, or to purchase healthier foods in favor of less healthy
options. Thaler and Sunstein call structures that influence
behavior "choice architecture." 2°9  They characterize libertarian
paternalism as "a relatively weak, soft, nonintrusive type of
paternalism. '210 The authors explain that "[t]o count as a mere
205 Paternalism, supra note 168 ("A strong paternalist believes that people may have
mistaken, confused or irrational ends and it is legitimate to interfere to prevent them from
achieving those ends."); Thompson, supra note 168, at 2 ('Strong paternalism would prevent
a person from achieving a desired consequence on the grounds that he may be confused or
mistaken about his ends but not if he understands his choice.").
206 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 198, at 4-6.
mo See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. Cmu. L. REV. 1159, 1159-67 (2003) (first proposing libertarian paternalism
as a theory for shaping popular choices).
m8 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 198, at 6-8; see also Blumenthal & Huang, supra
note 171, at 27.
2D9 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 198, at 3.
210 Id. at 5.
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nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid."211 Thus,
positioning healthy food at eye level on a grocery store shelf would
count as a nudge, while a workplace wellness program with a
potentially significant financial impact on nonparticipants would
not.
Yet these categories may not be as clear-cut as they first
appear. Consider, for example, Mayor Bloomberg's infamous soda
portion rule, colloquially known as the "Big Gulp ban," which
forbade the sale of certain quantities of sugary beverages. 212 The
Big Gulp ban operates on a wavering between the various kinds of
paternalism. On one hand, it outright prohibited buying large
sodas, making it appear at first blush like strong, hard
paternalism. That said, the law did not cap the number of
beverages a person could buy.213 Thus, an individual who wished
to drink twenty-four ounces of soda could do so by purchasing two
twelve-ounce containers. Viewed this way, the Big Gulp ban may
seem more like a libertarian paternalistic nudge to buy smaller
amounts of sugary drinks. Cass Sunstein addresses whether the
Big Gulp ban qualifies as a nudge in his book Why Nudge?214 He
notes that while people could bypass the Big Gulp ban by simply
buying more smaller sodas, the policy still affects freedom of choice
albeit it not aggressively. 215 He thus concludes that the Big Gulp
ban constitutes "a relatively soft form of nonlibertarian
paternalism." 216
Finally, Jeremy A. Blumenthal and Peter H. Huang have
advocated positive paternalism. 217 Like libertarian paternalism,
positive paternalism developed in response to discomfort with
211 Id. at 6.
212 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 150 (2013) (discussing various approaches to government health
regulation and describing the Big Gulp ban).
213 In re N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 110 A.D.3d 1, 6, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (affirming the Big Gulp
ban's invalidation).
214 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? (2014).
215 Id. at 76-77.
216 Id. at 78.
217 See Blumenthal & Huang, supra note 171, at 27 (discussing the benefits of positive
paternalism).
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traditional, coercive forms of paternalism. 218  Negative
paternalism focuses on protecting people from harm, whereas
positive paternalism aims to "help citizens flourish by helping
them develop their own strengths and weaknesses, by giving
incentives to engage in healthy activities or more optimal
decisionmaking, or by encouraging or even mandating engaging in
activities that, for instance, elevate mood in order to reap the
benefits of being in a positive mood."219 Hence, Blumenthal and
Huang advocate private or governmental policies that would
encourage people to make good choices. 220 As the authors explain,
"[r]ather than working to stop individuals from making mistakes,
[positive paternalism] seeks to build on their strengths."221 Hence,
a negative paternalist would prohibit riding a motorcycle without
a helmet, but a positive paternalist would reward helmet wearers.
Positive paternalism is not limited to soft nudges, however, but
might also include strong forms, such as mandatory physical
exercise in schools.222  Positive paternalists generally laud
workplace wellness programs, citing empirical data demonstrating
positive health outcomes and favorable opinions among
participants, even if they were initially reluctant and viewed the
programs as intruding on their liberty. 223 More recent scholarship
in positive paternalism has emphasized using government
regulations to empower people by teaching them how to make
218 See id. (suggesting that emphasizing the "potential to foster people's flourishing is
more palatable to the public' ").
219 Jeremy A- Blumenthal, A Psychological Defense of Paternalism, in PATERNALISM:
THEORY AND PRAcTIcE 210 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2013); see also Blumenthal & Huang, supra note 171 (defining positive parentalism and
explaining that it helps to build on individuals' strengths, rather than focusing on poor
decisionmaking); Huang, supra note 177, at 422 (noting that positive parentalism seeks to
build on people's strengths and character virtues).
20 See Blumenthal & Huang, supra note 171, at 27 (discussing examples of particular
government policies that may exemplify positive parentalism); Huang, supra note 177, at
422 (suggesting that people may perceive interventions favorably when they are framed as
encouragement towards a beneficial outcome, as opposed to a restriction on one's
autonomy).
2' Blumenthal & Huang, supra note 171.
222 Id. (suggesting the efficacy of "additional interventions" beyond just a "nudge').
223 Blumenthal, supra note 219, at 210.
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decision in their own best interests, thereby further differentiating
positive paternalists from libertarian paternaists. 224
The ultimate goal for our normative assessment is to
differentiate bad healthism from good health-status
differentiation. Paternalistic laws of various approaches can
promote individual and population health, and therefore, we
cannot dismiss them out of hand as undesirable. We recognize,
however, that the relentless pursuit of health would come at a cost
to personal dignity, liberty, and identity. Those potential costs
also encompass unfair treatment of the unhealthy. We recognize
that both economic rationality and potential positive impact
cannot alone justify health-based classification. Hence, an inquiry
into the acceptability of a particular health-based differentiation
must also include assessments of animus, stigma, loss of access,
and other manifestations of unfair discrimination. Paternalistic
laws that single out the unhealthy for differential treatment all
carry the risk of healthism. Therefore, we proceed cautiously in
determining which of those interventions are nevertheless socially
desirable.
C. OTHER CONCERNS
Roberts's prior work also identified other possible concerns
raised by legal prohibitions on health-status differentiation. Those
included unduly restricting freedom of contract, interfering with
the market, and eroding already recognized antidiscrimination
categories. 225 For example, prohibiting employers from making
hiring and termination decisions based on health status restricts
the common law employment-at-will doctrine.226 Likewise, other
224 In his recent work, Huang has expanded the concept of positive further to advocate for
positive parentoeconomics, a theory of regulation based on virtue theory designed to create
a learning society. See Peter H. Huang, Positive Institutions: Organizations, Laws, and
Policies, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2735616 (last visited July 10,
2014).
2m Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 619-23.
226 See National Conference of State Legislatures, The At-Will Presumption and
Exceptions to the Rule, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment-at-will-employ
ment-overview.aspx (describing at-will employment as meaning that "an employer can
terminate an employee at any time for any reason, except an illegal one, or for no reason
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laws and policies that would prohibit considerations of health
status, including airlines' price discrimination against overweight
customers, or physicians' refusal to treat difficult or especially
needy patients, restrict freedom of contract. Federal law has
recognized that race is not a valid consideration in contract
formation or enforcement 227 and could similarly provide that, at
least within certain contexts, health status has no place in private
contracts.
One response to the suggestion that the law should intervene to
restrict or prohibit healthist contracts is that there is no need
because the market will correct the problem without regulation.
In that regard, M. Todd Henderson has asserted that employees
who do not like having their health regulated by their employers
could simply take their skills and abilities elsewhere. 228 As long as
there are other, comparable, desirable jobs, the employee can
simply find an employer that does not impose healthist policies.
Henderson's suggestion can be expanded outside of the
employment context, as health-based regulation could affect the
market in all kinds of ways beyond who businesses employ, such
as what goods or services they offer, and to whom they can offer
those goods and services. For example, if one airline requires
significantly overweight passengers to pay for two seats, the
customer can simply find an alternative airline that offers non-
discriminatory fares. If the problem is significant enough, the
market may even drive airlines to cater to larger travelers.229
without incurring legal liability" and that an employee may similarly leave a job for any
reason at any time).
227 See Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil
Rights Protection, 66 MO. L. REV. 275, 306-09 (2001) (describing congressional action to
deter racial discrimination in the formation and the enforcement of contracts).
228 Henderson, supra note 74, at 1553.
229 By way of analogy, airlines have faced some pressure to offer "child free" flights. See
Douglas Quenqua, Please Refrain From Tantrums Onboard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, at
TR6. Meanwhile, other airlines have developed business strategies to attract families and
children. See generally Nadia Carriere, The Airline That Caters To Pregnant Women &




Finally, Roberts has acknowledged concern that creating a new
"ism" could put health on par with gender, race, age, and
disability, to the detriment of other recognized protected
categories. 230 In particular, critics have pushed back against
lifestyle discrimination legislation, arguing that those laws
inappropriately privilege certain choices (e.g., smoking) as on-par
with other, socially significant characteristics that are central to
personal identity, including religion and sexual orientation. 231
Without strong evidence that the unhealthy have been
disadvantaged historically or that the public perceives healthism
as a serious concern, those authors would not expand
discrimination law to include unhealthy conduct.232 As Roberts
stated, "[s]ome authors have even argued that an
antidiscrimination statute protecting unhealthy behavior
undermines the very goals of the American antidiscrimination
project itself, putting self-destructive behavior under the umbrella
of civil rights . -233 In other words, recognizing healthism
threatens to trivialize more longstanding, more socially harmful
forms of discrimination. Those concerns weigh in favor of allowing
entities to make health-status-based decisions, even if those
decisions negatively affect certain individuals.
We are certainly attuned to concern about proliferation of
protected categories and the potential for diluting the force of
existing antidiscrimination laws. But that hesitancy does not
answer the question whether health status should be legally
recognized in the same way as gender, race, ethnicity, religion,
disability, intellectual impairment, age, sexual orientation,
pregnancy, or genetic predisposition to illness. To varying degrees,
the law has disallowed discrimination based on all of those
characteristics. 234 Our project seeks to recognize at least some
legal protections for the unhealthy, and the scope, context, and
nature of those protections.
230 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 622.
231 Id. at 623.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Despite concluding that other policy preferences support
reduction or elimination of healthism,235 Roberts's earlier work
acknowledges that there are reasons for differentiating based on
health status in health insurance and employment. 236 This Part
has explored in greater depths the reasons why that
differentiation may not simply be justifiable but also socially
valuable, thus exploring the assumptions underlying her previous
work on healthism.
IV. A THEORY OF HEALTHISM
Earlier work on healthism identified some of the systematic
harms that may result from differentiation on the basis of health
status, but failed to articulate reasons why such differentiation is
undesirable in a manner that could be generalized outside of the
discrete examples of private health insurance and lifestyle
discrimination in the workplace. That is our goal in Part IV.
Here, we respond to the justifications for permitting arguably
healthist behavior outlined in Part III, exploring how those
reasons raise their own potential issues. We then turn to our
framework for distinguishing between discriminatory healthism
(necessarily resulting in a systematic, normative wrong) and non-
discriminatory health-status differentiation (which does not
warrant restriction).
A. LIMITS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS
While we may be able to identify cost-based justifications for
differentiation on the basis of health status, the presence of
economically rational explanations does not necessarily mean that
healthism is absent. We first note the many recognized limits to
the rational-actor model, including various biases, heuristics, and
2,3 See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 634 (noting that "additional lifestyle
discrimination protections may be in order").
236 See id. at 623-24 (asserting that healthism, as demonstrated through health-related
paternalism, can have a positive social impact).
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stereotypes. Humans try to shortcut decisionmaking using those
techniques, but they sometimes lead to flawed premises and
assumptions. 237 In particular, health-related stereotypes could
lead to both conscious and unconscious biases. This possibility is
especially likely in a culture that emphasizes individual
responsibility rather than more complex, sociocultural factors
affecting health.238 For example, many people hold the view that
smokers and overweight individuals are at fault for failing to quit
or to lose weight and resent the resulting drain on societal
resources. 239 Similarly, physicians may dismiss patients afflicted
with a host of complex medical conditions and other life stressors
as "uncooperative" or "noncompliant" when they fail to improve or
follow recommended treatment.24°
Health status is the subject of numerous stereotypes, which can
result in stigma extending beyond the health condition itself. For
example, smokers and overweight people face perceptions that
they are incompetent, unattractive, and lack self-control. 241
Wellness programs-in the workplace and even more so in the
public-benefits context242-as well as public health policies 243 may
?7 See generally Geoffrey M. Hodgson, On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory, 1 ECON.
THOUGHT 94 (2012), http://et.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/ETHodgson-lI.pdf
(asserting that rational choice theory's "universal explanation" characteristic makes it too
general and thus too limited to apply to the real world).
238 See, e.g., Lionel Shriver, The Best Cure for Obesity? Personal Responsibility, TIME
(June 26, 2013), http://ideas.time.comI2013/O6/26/the-best-cure-for-obesity-personal-respons
ibility/ (asserting that "there are.., no medical cures for obesity that improve on
willpower").
m See Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 585 (discussing the stigmas and negative
opinions smokers and overweight individuals encounter).
240 See Mantel & Roberts, supra note 167.
241 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 585-86.
'2 See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Wellness Programs And Medicaid
FAQ, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 21, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/11/21/imple
monting health reform wellness, programo and medicaid-faq/ (discuooing how wcllncoo
programo authorized by the ACA that allow rewarde or premiumo ba3cd on participation in
activities on unpaid time can be hard on low income employees); Tara Mancini, More
Research Needed on Medicaid Wellness Programs, CHILDREN'S HEALTH POL'Y BLoG (Apr.
15, 2013), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/more-research-needed-on-medicaid-welness-progra
ms/ (discussing how Medicaid healthist programs currently in existence lack evaluations
and cvidcncc of thcir cffcctivcnc3a in achieving their goals of cutting health costs and
changing behavior); Aimoo Milos, Medicaid to Offer Rewards for Healthy Bchavior, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 11, 2011), http://khn.org/news/medicaid-incentives/ (discus3ing how
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perpetuate stigma by placing the blame for failing to achieve
better health on individual failings, rather than a host of
interdependent societal, cultural, economic, and other pressures
that make participation in such programs difficult, if not
impossible, for certain people. 244 Moreover, in addition to being
socially harmful, these stigmatic perceptions are patently false.
For example, research indicates that sedentary individuals may in
fact be more productive workers with respect to desk jobs.245
Even apparently facially neutral policies can reinforce stigma
against the unhealthy. For example, bans or taxes on certain
foods and drinks, such as the Big Gulp ban or laws restricting
restaurants' use of salt or trans-fats, apply equally to everyone
regardless of weight. 246 Such policies do not single out overweight
individuals. In that sense, one could argue that they are not a
healthist laws at all.247  But with regard to public health
interventions to limit the consumption of particular foods and
drinks, Lindsay F. Wiley has observed that at times, "political
programs that give Medicaid credits to be redeemed for things like diapers and gym
memberships in return for certain healthy activities have mixed results because many are
unaware of the program or businesses refuse to accept the credits).
m See Wiley, supra note 212, at 150 (describing efforts by state and local governments to
ban or regulate certain foods and beverages).
244 See Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle
Discrimination-The Legal Limits, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 192, 192 (2008) (noting the
ethical issues surrounding wellness programs and the dominant theme of personal
responsibility); Wiley et al., supra note 175, at 88-89 (discussing the tension between
personal responsibility and the nanny state and the impact on parents' rights to choose
what they and their children eat).
245 See Matt Silverman, Your Desk Job Makes You Fat, Sick, and Dead, MASHABLE.COM
(Mar. 2, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/03/02/work-death-infographic/#97DWuCJwtOqJ
("The productivity of the average worker has skyrocketed thanks to technology, but it comes
at a price of sedentary lifestyle."); Andrew Soergel, CareerBuilder Study Finds Job
Opportunities Beyond the Desk, USNEwS.COM (Apr. 16, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.
usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/16/careerbuilder-study-finds-job-opportunities-beyond-th
e-desk (finding that desk workers report higher salaries).
246 See 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53 (repealed 2015) (imposing an absolute ban on all sugary drinks
over sixteen fluid ounces to all consumers).
247 See Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the Law: The
Normative Impact of Product Configuration Bans, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1877, 1885-87 (2014)
(discussing how bans serve to reduce exposure to certain unhealthy habits and change
overall social acceptance of such behavior).
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opposition has focused on the idea that thin people, who can enjoy
soda or unhealthy food without packing on the pounds, should not
have to suffer because of the sins of fat people who do not know
when to stop."248 Similarly, workplace wellness programs also are
facially neutral, applying to all workers. 249 Like Wiley, we are
concerned, however, that those policies could perpetuate stigma by
shifting responsibility onto employees and away from broader,
systemic factors that affect health. Even with health-neutral
classifications, the targeted group could still face stigma for
prompting the intervention in the first place. Thus, even a
perceived connection between the stigmatized group and the
health-related policy could perpetuate existing stigma.
Negative stereotypes can lead to animus. Animus is a widely
accepted-and largely undisputed-reason for prohibiting negative
differential conduct in the context of accepted antidiscrimination
categories, such as race, sex, age, and disability. 250 In fact, the
Supreme Court has held that even legislation with some practical
import still fails the notoriously lax rational basis test in equal
protection if the legislature was acting out of animus. 251 Animus
could likewise make seemingly rational health-based
classifications healthist if a law, regulation, or policy is adopted
primarily because of negative attitudes toward the targeted group.
Moreover, a significant amount of social science and
antidiscrimination literature reveals that discrimination does not
always happen at a conscious level.25 2 Because of the role of
248 Wiley, supra note 212, at 185 (citation omitted).
249 See Jost, supra note 242 (observing that such programs are "available to all similarly
situated individuals").
250 See Elizabeth Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness and the ADA 16
(U. Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 74, 2004) ("A person discriminates
based on animus if he treats someone differently because of dislike or hostility towards the
protected class of which that person is a member. The idea arises from ... the concept of a
'taste for discrimination' that runs counter to an employer's hardheaded interests in market
success." (citation omitted)).
251 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 433, 450 (1985) (applying the
rational basis test to invalidate a restriction based on irrational prejudice).
252 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1165, 1188 (1995) (noting that biased employment decisions in large part result from
unintentional and unconscious cognitive bias); see also Tristin Green, Discrimination in
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stereotyping in human cognition, it may be impossible for
decisionmakers not to engage their negative perceptions related to
health status. The result is that even individuals who sincerely
believe that they are acting without bias may still be making
decisions based on stereotypes. 253 For example, lawmakers may
enact legislation allowing discriminatory pricing in health
insurance based on tobacco use without actually examining
whether that particular health-related conduct imposes
significantly greater costs than other social practices that are not
fraught with the same degree of negative associations, such as
drinking alcohol; failing to wear seatbelts or helmets; not using
sunblock or getting annual checkups; neglecting to take vacations,
exercise, get adequate sleep, or practice mindfulness, yoga; or
other stress-reduction techniques. In sum, it may seem easy and
obvious to target tobacco use, but instinct may reside more in
unconscious bias than empirical evidence.
Setting aside bias, stereotype, and other judgment errors that
mar the rational-actor model, cost-effectiveness itself does not fully
justify healthism. As noted in Part III, there may be other good
reasons to reject a particular policy or practice even if there are
economically rational reasons to support it. For example, in the
Workploc flynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparatc Treatment Theory, 88
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95 (2003) ("[A] mounting body of evidence indicates that a
number of social and structural changes in the workplace have affected the ways in which
discrimination operates.'); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 745 (2005) ("There is little doubt that unconscious
discrimination plays a significant role in decisions about hiring, promoting, firing, and the
other benefits and tribulations of the workplace."); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALiF. L. REV. 969, 975 (2006) ("Implicit bias is largely automatic;
the characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orientation) operates so quickly, in the
relevant tests, that people have no time to deliberate."); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 467 (2010)
(discussing "mental processes that affect social judgments but operate without conscious
awareness or conscious control"); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) ("Cognitive
bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction have replaced deliberate
racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued inequality.').
253 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 252, at 975 (noting that individuals are often
surprised to learn about their own implicit biases).
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insurance context, it makes perfect sense that an insurer would
prefer not to sell a policy to someone with a known or very high
risk of developing a health condition. Nevertheless, Roberts
concludes that health care should be viewed as a fundamental
right available to all, regardless of health status.254  She is
certainly not alone in explicitly rejecting the classic, actuarial-
fairness conceptions of health insurance in favor of a mutual-aid
model. The ACA largely enshrines that alternate model.255
Whether a particular action is economically rational is, therefore,
a factor to weigh when assessing its impact, but is not
determinative in and of itself.
Consider also lifestyle discrimination in the workplace. We do
not suggest that an employer's consideration of employees' or
applicants' out-of-work conduct is necessarily irrational or without
cost-justification. 256 Such discrimination is cost-justified to the
extent that unhealthy employees-including smokers and
overweight individuals, as well as recreational drug users,
mountain climbers, skydivers, and sunbathers-may cost more to
insure and have lower productivity and higher absenteeism. 257
?1 See Roberts, Insurance, supra note 6, at 1198, 1204 (adopting the "universal right"
approach to health care where "everyone is entitled to a certain basic level of coverage").
255 In attempting to expand coverage to all Americans, the ACA adopts a principle of
universality. See Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 151, at 3 ("The ACA ... espous[ed] a
principle of inclusion or 'universality' by facilitating universal health insurance coverage.").
256 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 167 (discussing how people constantly "use some traits
as proxies for other traits" in relation to particular decisions, such as hiring and firing
decisions).
257 See Dan Witters & Sangeeta Agrawal, Unhealthy U.S. Workers' Absenteeism Costs
$158 Billion, GALLUP (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/pol/150026/unhealthy-worker
s-absenteeism-costs-153-bilion.aspx (stating that full-time workers in the U.S. who are
overweight, obese, or have other chronic health problems miss approximately 450 million
additional days of work per year compared to healthy workers). To be sure, the ACA
prohibits discrimination in health insurance based on individual health status. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg (2012). But an employer may still be charged higher rates for a group health
insurance plan, or pay more in claims if it self-insures, based on the risk profile of the group
of employers it insures. See Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler, What Health Insurance Exchanges
or Choice Pools Can and Can't Do About Risks and Costs, INST. FOR HEALTH POLY
SOLUTIONS (May 2009), http://www.ihps.org/pubs/WhatHealthInsuranceExchangesor
ChoicePoolsCanandCantDoAboutRisksandCosts.pdf (explaining that a group's risk profile
affects its ability to offer favorable insurance prices, and that it is significant in that a large
share of health-care costs are generated by a relatively small number of people). Therefore,
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Accordingly, from a rational business perspective, it makes sense
that employers would prefer not to hire workers engaged in those
activities.
Even if we accept employers' justifications for health-status
discrimination, there may be other policy reasons why we would
prefer to restrict or prohibit discrimination based on after-hours
lifestyle choices and activities. Opponents of lifestyle
discrimination are especially concerned with protecting workers'
privacy regarding their non-work behaviors, habits, and
preferences. 258 Considering the wide range of voluntary conduct
that bears on health (e.g., relationship instability, sleep patterns,
stress levels, recreational activities, drunk driving, and sexual
promiscuity), there would seem to be no limit to employers' health-
related inquiries and discrimination in the name of lower health
insurance costs. Roberts, therefore, suggests several reasons,
including privacy, autonomy, and anti-paternalism, for regulating
lifestyle discrimination in employment. 259
Moreover, Roberts suggests that such practices perpetuate
discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups, namely,
racial and ethnic minorities, the disabled, and low-income
workers, citing data revealing the higher incidence of tobacco use
and obesity in those groups. 260 The resulting discrimination
operates at multiple levels, denying the aforementioned groups
both employment and access to employer-based health insurance.
In addition to compounding the effect of existing discrimination,
she also questions whether these groups have meaningful choices
for avoiding unhealthy conduct. 261 Also, she identifies various
limits of relying on economic justifications by undermining the
employers have an economically rational business interest in maintaining a healthy
workforce.
25 See Sugarman, supra note 75, at 402-06 (discussing the ways employment decisions
based on off-work conduct may unfairly invade employees' and applicants' privacy).
29 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 611-14.
26 Id. at 616-18.
261 Id. at 618 (noting that "policies that encourage or reward healthier lifestyle choices
assume the voluntariness of those changes without taking significant account of the
impediments certain groups may face in actually implementing those behaviors').
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premise that individuals can easily avoid the discriminatory
treatment by changing their conduct. Those concerns, she would
say, trump and belie the asserted cost justifications.
We offer another example of the limits of economic rationality
in health-status discrimination, this time, from the torts context.
Classic defenses to tort liability include contributory negligence or
assumption of the risk by the injured party.262  With those
affirmative defenses, the tortfeasor is asserting that even if he
were the wrongdoer, the victim should receive less than full
recovery (or perhaps no recovery) because the victim was at least
partially responsible for his own injuries. 26 3  It may seem
intuitively equitable, as a matter of individual responsibility and
incentives for safety, to deny or reduce recovery to a plaintiff who
chooses to engage in health-risky activity.
Consider someone who fails to wear available seatbelts,
intentionally disables safety guards on a circular saw, or willingly
signs a waiver of liability before bungee jumping. Despite the
plausible reasons for limiting recovery to individuals injured in the
course of those activities, courts may conclude otherwise on the
basis of other considerations related to third parties' incentives.
Disallowing or reducing recovery to the non-seatbelt-wearing
driver involved in a car accident with a driver who is negligently
speeding, runs a red light, or is intoxicated, allows the negligent
driver to avoid full liability for his actions. 26 4 Disallowing a
product user to recover when he modifies or misuses the product
fails to incentivize manufacturers to improve the safety features or
2 See RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS § 463 (1934) (defining contributory negligence as
conduct on the plaintiffs part which constitutes a legally contributing cause to bringing
about plaintiffs harm); id. § 893 (describing assumption of risk and the ability to apply it as
a defense to various torts).
2 See SHAVELL, supra note 162, at 15-16 (describing the concept of contributory
negligence).
264 See Michael B. Rick, Failure to Wear Seat Belts as Contributory Negligence: The
Development of the Wisconsin Rule, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 662, 665 (1967) (noting that
completely barring recovery to a person whose failure to wear seatbelts contributed to his
injuries seems like a harsh result, "especially since a plaintiffs failure to buckle up could
not be held to be a cause of the accident).
[Vol. 50:833890
WHAT IS (AND ISN'T) HEAL THISM?
warnings on their products.265 Enforcing voluntary waivers of
liability for dangerous activities elevates freedom of contract over
public safety. 266 Accordingly, courts may conclude that it is more
important for the defendant in those scenarios to bear the loss and
get the message about safety. Those countervailing arguments
suggest that the plaintiffs' health-related conduct should not count
against them. In those contexts, differentiation on the basis of
health status is undesirable even if it possesses instinctive appeal.
B. LIMITS OF PATERNALISM
Paternalism may at times justify making distinctions based on
health. But there are also reasons to question the appropriateness
of those laws and policies. Such laws are notoriously anti-
libertarian and subject to criticism about "Big Government" or
"Big Business" intruding too deeply in the private lives and
personal choices of citizens. 267 As a threshold matter, we must
ask: Do we want the government or employers intentionally
influencing, no matter how subtly, the choices we make with
respect to something as personal as our health?
Decisions that directly affect our health-including what we
eat, whether we smoke or consume alcohol, what sort of sexual
relations we enter, and how much we sleep and exercise--can be
incredibly intimate. Because they relate to decisions about how we
treat our bodies, they implicate the cherished American ideals of
freedom, privacy, and personal autonomy. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, we enjoy substantive due process rights to bodily
265 Cf. Richard A Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.
L. REV. 643, 656 (1978) (describing and criticizing a case in which the court allowed the
plaintiff to reach the jury in a products liability case, even though the accident that caused
his injury had occurred only after he had attempted to remove a foreign object from the
product without first shutting it down).
" See, e.g., Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 244 Va. 191, 196 (1992) (affirming that
tho dofendant'c waiver of liability for a triathlon, which plaintiff had cigned prior to hio
injury, was void as a matter of public policy in accordance with Virginia law).
267 See, e.g., Wiley et al., supra note 175, at 88 (noting that the reaction to New York City's




integrity and freedom from bodily restraint.268 While those rights
are far from absolute, they imply that the ability to make choices
about what to do with our own bodies is among our most
fundamental liberties. Moreover, these freedoms demonstrate the
centrality of autonomy in the American psyche. Autonomy has
long been deemed a central value in American life and culture. 269
One of our country's canonical documents is called the Declaration
of Independence. 27 0 Hence, Americans tend to resist efforts to
control and modify our behavior, dismissing them pejoratively as
"nannyism." 271
As revealed in Part III, however, paternalistic interventions can
carry with them real social benefits. Consequently, having an
entity act as a nanny could generate meaningful good. With
respect to promoting health, the two most common types of
nannies are the government and employers. Cities, states, or the
federal government can all pass laws designed to encourage
healthy choices or discourage unhealthy ones. The Big Gulp ban is
an example of a paternalistic municipal policy. 272 The ACA's tax
on indoor tanning (popularly dubbed the "Snooki tax") represents a
similar paternalistic initiative at the federal level.273 That law
does not prohibit but merely penalizes unhealthy choices, offering
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law....").
2m See MARTHA ALBERTSON F1NEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
10 (2004) (referring to autonomy independence and self-sufficiency as core American
concepts).
270 See id. at 11 (noting that the Declaration of Independence is one of several
foundational American myths).
271 For a discussion of "nannyism," see Kelly McParland, Liberty Will Survive the Scourge
of Nannyism, and the Threat of the Large Soda, NATL POST (June 26, 2012, 9:29 AM),
http://ncwo.nationalpost.com/full-comment/kelly-mcparland liberty wl survivo the scourg
e-of-nannyism-and-the-threat-of-the-large-soda ("The politics of nannyism is intriguingly
complex, perhaps because it attempts to harmonize two very disparate forces: human
nature and politicians trying to hold onto their jobs.').
2 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. The varieties of paternalism reflected in
this policy would be strong (as opposed to weak), hard (as opposed to soft), and impure (as
opposed to pure).
273 See Sarah Kliff, The IRS Debates the Snooki Tax, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-irs-debates-the-snooki-tax/201 1/10/1 1/gI
QAGFKSdL blog.html ( Included among the health reform law's many funding streams is a
tanning tax, a 10 percent fee on indoor tanning services.').
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an incentive to refrain from the activity; however, in so doing, it
fails to educate or to better inform the public of the risks of refined
sugar or tanning beds.
Private entities, including employers, can also act as nannies in
at least two ways. First, they can design their employment
policies to support or discourage certain behaviors. For example,
the bans on hiring nicotine users can be understood as employers
discouraging prospective employees from smoking. Second,
employers can use the health insurance policies that they offer to
nudge their employees to lose weight or stop using tobacco/nicotine
via employee wellness programs. These programs are pure
paternalism of the soft variety, aimed directly at the individuals
that employers seek to protect from their own "bad" choices or
behaviors. They operate as incentives rather than outright bans
on smoking or unhealthy eating. But these policies exert different
degrees of coercion. Being denied a job is likely much harder to
ignore than being offered a discount on one's contribution toward
employer-based health insurance. In any case, corporate
nannyism is arguably preferable to government nannyism because
it is less intrusive.27 4 Nevertheless, employers could still prove to
be very powerful nannies, especially if alternate employment
options are not readily available.
But putting aside the identity of the nanny in question, in order
for any paternalistic policy designed to encourage healthy
decisionmaking to be fair and effective, individuals must have the
ability to actually make better decisions. 275  There are good
reasons to doubt that that is always the case. As Martha
Albertson Fineman has explained, autonomy is only useful as a
concept if individual choices are not unduly restricted by external
factors like poverty. 276 Put differently, we cannot nudge people
24 See generally Henderson, supra note 74 (discussing the superiority of corporate
nannies).
275 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
276 FINE MA, supra note 269, at 30 (noting that autonomy only has "moaning in situations
in which individual choices are not made impossible, constrained by inequalities,
particularly those inequalities that arise from poverty").
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who lack meaningful choices. 277  Recent research on social
determinants of health has called into question people's ability to
make seemingly voluntary choices about their health and
wellness.278 Those studies challenge the entire premise underlying
the public policy trend toward individual responsibility, which
suggests that if someone fails to maintain adequate health or
financial stability, he only has himself to blame. In reality,
however, someone may be unable to eat and exercise to maintain a
healthy weight not because she is lazy and unwilling, but because
she is a single-parent breadwinner living in an inner-city "food
desert,"279 with no safe recreational spaces free of urban violence.
Those realities demonstrate that paternalistic interventions
designed to encourage healthy decisionmaking must be carefully
crafted not to penalize people for failing to select preferred options
that are outside their control.
Finally, paternalistic interventions may backfire if they create
perverse incentives. Take the ACA's support for a tobacco
surcharge. While designed as an incentive for tobacco users to
quit, instead smokers faced with medium or high penalties chose
to forgo coverage altogether to avoid elevated premiums. 280
277 See generally Roberts & Fowler, supra note 84.
9,78 See, e.g., Victoria Inglis et al., Does Modifying the Household Food Budget Predict
Changes in the Healthfulness of Purchasing Choices Among Low- and High-Income
Women?, 52 APPETITE 273, 273 (conducting a study and discovering that low-income women
would buy healthier food if given a larger budget); Rickelle Richards & Chery Smith,
Environmental, Parental, and Personal Influences on Food Choice, Access, and Overweight
Status Among Homeless Children, 65 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1572, 1572 (2007) (explaining that
"shelter rules, lack of adequate storage and cooking facilities, and limited food stores near
the shelter, impacted the type and quality of food choices ultimately affecting hunger
weight status, and perceived health" for homeless children in a study).
279 See Jeremy Bowman, Food Deserts: Where Have All the Inner-City Grocery Stores
Gone?, DAILY FIN. (Apr. 4, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/0404/food-
deserts-where-have-all-the-inner-city-grocery-stores-gone/ (using the term "food desert" to
describe the increasing absence of traditional supermarkets with healthy food choices in
inner cities).
280 Abigail S. Friedman et al., Evidence Suggests that the ACA's Tobacco Surcharges
Reduced Insurance Take-Up and Did Not Increase Smoking Cessation, 35 HEALTH AFFAIRS
1176 (2016).
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C. CREATING A FRAMEWORK
Because not all differentiations on the basis of health status are
equally harmful, we provide a list of criteria for differentiating
between socially undesirable healthism and acceptable health-
status classifications. We propose that healthism occurs when
differentiation on the basis of health status:
" Is driven by animus,
* Stigmatizes individuals unfairly, 281
* Punishes people for their private conduct,
* Impedes access to health care,
" Cuts off resources or otherwise limits the ability to
adopt healthy life choices,
* Produces worse health outcomes, or
* Maintains or increases existing disparities.
Health-status distinctions that meet one or more of these criteria
are healthist and, therefore, call for legal or policy intervention.
Of course, some health-status-based policies occupy a middle
ground: they neither generate harm nor produce benefit. We
maintain that law- and policy-makers should likewise remain
neutral regarding these classifications, neither prohibiting nor
encouraging them.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from healthism exists
socially desirable policies that differentiate based on health status.
Law and policy should not only permit but also encourage these
types of classifications. A socially desirable health-status
differentiation might:
* Promote healthy decisionmaking,
* Facilitate individual choices regarding health,
" Lower health risks,
281 Our concern regarding stigma formation may mean that when able to choose we would
choose public health campaigns based in "destigmatization" versus "denormalization." See
Wiley, supra note 212.
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" Lower health-care costs, and/or
" Facilitate better health care and better health-care
access.
Thus, in circumstances where differentiations on the basis of
health status could actually promote individual or public health,
law and policy should encourage those distinctions.
D. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
The above frameworks provide a rubric for distinguishing
between "good" and "bad" health-status differentiations. We can
now apply them to a variety of contexts to see if law or policy
should be against, neutral, or in favor of particular kinds of
interventions on the basis of health status. We apply our
framework to six different scenarios: (1) the nicotine and obesity
bans that inspired Roberts's initial work on healthism in
employment; (2) the recently challenged pricing of prescription
drug benefits for HIV/AIDS patients; (3) workplace tobacco
cessation programs; (4) employer access to medical information
related to workplace wellness programs; (5) the Big Gulp ban; and
(6) the Snooki tax.
1. Easy Cases. The first scenario-bans on hiring nicotine
users and overweight people-presents paradigmatic healthist
conduct. As a threshold matter, society generally holds very
negative perceptions of smokers and overweight individuals,
thereby indicating that such policies could be driven, at least in
part, by animus.28 2 The absence or rarity of similar lifestyle
discrimination policies targeting alcohol consumption or high-risk
recreational activities (e.g., mountain climbing, racecar driving,
scuba-diving, spelunking), which may present similar or greater
threats to health and productivity, suggests the particularly
2 See generally Amanda J. Dillard et al, Perceptions of Smokers Influence Nonsmoker
Attitudes and References for Interactions, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH., Apr. 2013, at 43 (finding
that nonsmokers tended to hold negative attitudes about smokers); E.L. Harvey & AJ. Hill,
Health Professionals' Views of Overweight People and Smokers, 25 INT'L J. OBESITY 1253
(2001) (finding that health professionals' attitudes towards overweight people could be
"neutral to negative" and that most of the negativity was directed towards the obese).
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negative view reserved for tobacco and obesity. Workplace hiring
bans also stigmatize nicotine users and overweight people by
reducing them to single characteristics-either nicotine use or
weight-without regard for their other attributes that could make
them good employees.
Moreover, those hiring bans can have spillover effects on
health-care access. Health care is very expensive in the United
States, making most people dependent on health insurance for
obtaining needed medical treatment.28 3 A majority of non-elderly
Americans rely on their employers for health insurance.284 Hence,
denying an individual a job because she tests positive for nicotine
or is overweight also denies her access to the predominant source
of health insurance and perhaps also access to health care as a
result. Likewise, it denies her wages to pay for health care out-of-
pocket, as well as the benefits of employer-provided wellness
programs, which-perhaps ironically-frequently include tobacco-
cessation or weight-loss initiatives. Nicotine-use and obesity bans
therefore cut off resources and limit a person's ability to adopt
healthier life choices. Shutting nicotine users and overweight
people out of employment may paradoxically produce a healthier
workforce but a less healthy overall population. In addition,
because people of color, people with disabilities, and lower-income
individuals are more likely to use nicotine or to be overweight, 28 5
nicotine-use and obesity bans disproportionately affect these
groups' potentially perpetuating existing health disparities.
We have acknowledged employers' economically rational
justifications for refusing to hire nicotine users and overweight
individuals. To the extent those conditions are correlated with
higher health-care costs, higher rates of absenteeism, higher rates
of workplace injury and accidents (including fires from smokers),
?83 See Katherine B. Wilson, Health Care Costs 101: ACA Spurs Modest Growth, CAL.
HEALTH CARE FOUND. (May 2016), http://www.chcf.org/publications/2016/05/health-care-
costs-101 (reporting that U.S. health spending reached $3 trillion in 2014).
281 See Employer-Sponsored Coverage, AMERICA'S HEALTH INS. PLANS, https://www.ahip.
org/Issues/Employer-Sponsored-Coverage.aspx (last visited June 3, 2016) (reporting that
149 million nonelderly Americans rely on employers for health insurance).
285 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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and lower productivity, it makes sense that employers might want
to avoid taking those workers onto their payrolls. But the
empirical evidence for those correlations is not undisputed. 286
Moreover, even if undisputed evidence did exist, we suggest
countervailing reasons for prohibiting that sort of healthist
workplace practice. It is possible that hiring bans nudge smokers
or overweight individuals to cease their unhealthy conduct or
behaviors, but paternalism does not seem to be the primary
motivation for such policies. Accordingly, we do not see them
having a significant effect in terms of promoting healthy
decisionmaking, facilitating healthier individual choices, lowering
health risks, lowering health-care costs, or facilitating better
health care and better health-care access.
For all these reasons, those bans are healthist. Moreover, they
are outside the scope of the existing antidiscrimination laws,
including the ADA, ACA, HIPAA, and GINA- As a result, law- and
policy-makers should intervene to regulate this socially harmful
conduct. Many states have already enacted legislation prohibiting
lifestyle discrimination in the workplace, and Roberts advocated
similar legislation at the federal level.28 7
The second scenario--discriminatory pricing of insurance
coverage for medications to treat HIV/AIDS-provides another
clear-cut example of healthism.288 Such practices came under legal
attack in the state of Florida.28 9 According to the lawsuit, health
insurers charged greater co-payments and co-insurance for drugs
to treat HIV/AIDS than for other conditions.290 The plaintiffs
further alleged that the increased costs have a harmful effect on
patients' ability to seek treatment. 291 The effect, if not the goal, of
286 See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
287 Roberts, Employment, supra note 6, at 607.
288 See Jane Perkins & Wayne Turner, NHeLP and The AIDS Institute Complaint to HHS
Re HIV/AIDS Discrimination by Florida Insurers, HEALTHLAW.ORG (May 29, 2014), http:I
www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-pubhcationsHHS-HIV-Complaint#.Vu3JC5r5O
M8 (alleging that several Qualified Health Plans offered by various insurers charged
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the policy was to discourage patients from enrolling in those plans
and to push them towards other plans. 292 Given the highly
stigmatized history of HIV/AIDS, 293 the discriminatory pricing
regime may very well have been animus-driven and could reinforce
stigma. Additionally, insofar as HIV/AIDS patients are
disproportionately gay or intravenous drug users, the high
insurance costs may arguably punish them for their private
conduct. 294 But at a minimum, those expenses impede health-care
access and limit the ability to seek treatment, which could then
exacerbate health conditions and increase health disparities.
Moreover, there is no apparent social benefit to charging more
for insurance to treat HIV/AIDS. The challenged policies do not
encourage healthy decisions, facilitate choice, lower risks, reduce
costs, or produce better health-care access. If anything, higher
cost-sharing would likely reduce patients' ability to access care and
could lead to even greater negative health impacts, as untreated
individuals may be more likely to transmit the disease. The very
purpose of co-payments and co-insurance is to address moral
hazard. 295 Having to pay something out-of-pocket is supposed to
make patients think carefully before seeking medical care. 296
There is no good reason to make HIV/AIDS patients think twice
22 See Press Release, Nat'l Health Law Prog., NHeLP and The Aids Institute File
HIV/AIDS Discrimination Complaint Against Florida Health Insurers (May 29, 2014),
http://www.healthlaw.org/news/press-releases/224-nhelp-and-the-aids-institute-file-hivaids-
discrimin (statement of Wayne Turner, NIeLP staff attorney) ('The companies are going
out of their way to discourage people with HIV/AIDS from enrolling in their plans-a
blatantly illegal practice.").
23 See Stigma, Discrimination and HIV, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-
social-issues/stigma-discrimination (describing the history of stigma surrounding
HIW/AIDS).
29 See New HIV Infections in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://
www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/2012/hiv-infections-2007-2010.pdf (last visited June 4,
2016) (reporting that gay and bisexual men are disproportionately affected by HIV and that
injection drug users represented approximately eight percent of new HIV infections in
2010).
25 See supra notes 146-47.
26 See Mark Pothier, Out-of-Pocket Costs Put Health Care Out of Reach, BOS. GLOBE
(June 25, 2015) ("Insurers... argue that out-of-pockets make subscribers sensitive to the
real cost of care.").
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before taking medications. Thus, the discriminatory pricing
appears to be yet another clear example of healthism, again
leading to the conclusion that the law should intervene.
Thankfully, the ACA's ban on disability discrimination in
health care, including insurance, seems to offer the claimants
relief. The ACA prohibits insurers from refusing to cover
individuals on the basis of health status as well as from
structuring plan benefits that discriminate on the basis of
disability. 297 Florida insurance regulations offer an even clearer
fix, expressly prohibiting discrimination in insurance on the basis
of HIV/AIDS. 298  Based on those laws, the Florida Office of
Insurance Regulation issued a memo to health insurers, capping
the price of certain HIV/AIDS drugs and warning that the agency
will screen all 2016 health plans for discriminatory pricing.299
By contrast, an easy case of a non-healthist policy that
discriminates based on health status would be a participation-
based, employee smoking-cessation program. Those programs
typically offer a range of supportive services, funded fully or
partially by the employer, including individual coaching, support
groups, web-based tracking and support, and smoking cessation
297 Section 1557 provides that
an individual shall not, on [the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age,
or disability], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any
part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits,
subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that
is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under
this title.
42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012); accord Michelle Andrews, Complaint Says Insurance Plans
Discriminate Against HlIV Patients, NPR (July 8, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/secti
onslhealth-shots/2014/07/08/3295915 74/complaint-says-insurance-plans-discriminate-again
st-hiv-patients ("Under the Affordable Care Act, insurers are prohibited from rejecting
customers because of medical condition. They... cannot offer plans with benefit designs
that discriminate based on someone's degree of disability, health conditions or expected
length of life.").
29 Ron Hurtibise, State Tells Insurers to Limit Co-pays for HIVIAIDS Drugs, SUN
SENTINEL (July 1, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.sun-sentinel.combusiness/consumer/fl-hiv-
drug-review-20150630-story.html.
2 Memorandum from the Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation to All Insurers Authorized to
Write Life & Health Insurance Products in Florida (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.floir.com/site
Documents/PPACANoticeToIndustry03242015.pdf.
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drugs. 3°° Smoking cessation programs necessarily target smokers,
technically constituting differentiation on the basis of health
status. But as long as all employees can participate fully-i.e., so
long as there are no structural barriers to participation, such as
requiring individuals to attend meetings across town that would
require having a car or access to child care-the intervention
would not be healthist. The ACA itself includes protections for
people for whom participation in certain wellness programs would
be unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable. 301 Moreover,
the program should be carefully designed to avoid stigmatizing
participants, even if that requires employers to permit workers
time away from work duties to participate or publicly recognized
quitting milestones to the employee community. Even with the
risk of stigma, the benefits of those initiatives, if effective, could
also lower workers' health risks and, in turn, their potential
health-care costs. In such contexts, the law should not only permit
health-status classifications but also encourage them.
2. Harder Cases. While the cases above come out rather neatly,
we do not mean to imply that our frameworks will always generate
unambiguous outcomes. We now apply them to three more
complex examples: (1) recent EEOC challenges described in the
introduction; (2) the Big Gulp ban; and (3) the Snooki Tax.
As mentioned, the EEOC filed suit against two employers for
requiring their employees to submit to biometric testing as part of
their wellness programs. 3 2 Employees who refused to submit to
the testing faced cancellation of their health insurance,
unspecified "disciplinary action," and the requirement to take on
the full cost of their insurance to maintain coverage.3 03 The
300 See AM. CANCER SOC'Y, STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING AND IMPLEMENTING A SMOKE-
FREE WORKPLACE 6, http://www.cancer.org/downloads/gahelhp strategies-for-promoting-
andimplementing-smokefree workplace.pdf (suggesting support to offer to smokers who
want to quit, including cessation classes or counseling, coverage for medication, telephone
quit lines, community-based cessation programs, encouraging offering information for how
nonsmokers can help, and recommending that employers fund the programs).
301 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D).
302 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
303 Press Release, EEOC, supra note 8.
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lawsuits allege that those penalties were severe enough to render
the programs involuntary because they effectively compelled
employees to participate.3 4 The EEOC alleged that the testing
violated the ADA because the health-related inquiries and
examinations were neither job-related nor consistent with a
business necessity. 30 5
With regard to the healthism metric, it is not clear that the
biometric testing requirement was animus-driven or stigmatizing,
as all employees, regardless of health status, were eligible to
participate. 3°6 Moreover, such initiatives could potentially improve
health-care access by compelling employees to identify health
issues and incentivizing them to address those issues. Some
individuals might not otherwise have had access to opportunities
to improve their health.
But the policy could meet our criterion of punishing people for
their private conduct, depending on the nature of the subsequent
wellness programs for which the testing is a precondition. While
some wellness programs are participation based, other programs
may include financial incentives, styled as rewards or penalties for
achieving or failing to achieve certain goals. 30 7 If employees are
rewarded not merely for participating in the program but for
attaining certain health metrics (e.g., weight loss, body-mass
index30 8), they may be punished for their diet and exercise regime.
3MId.
3% Id.
306 See Frequently Asked Questions for Honeywell Employees Regarding HealthResource
and Incentives, HONEYWELL (Oct. 20, 2014), https://honeywelLcom/sites/USAnnual_ Enroll
Pages/FAQS.aspx (noting that "[w]ellness programs are available to all employees," and
that employees enrolled in the Honeywell Medical plan "can receive a company-provided
contribution to [their] HSA if [they] complete a biometric screening').
3w See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY:
FINAL REPORT (2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/pups/research-reports/RR200/RR2
54/RANDRR254.sum.pdf (identifying workplace wellness programs that incentivized
smokers).
o5 The ACA treats as a distinct category, with additional requirements, wellness
programs for which "any of the conditions for obtaining a premium discount, rebate, or
reward... is based on an individual satisfying a standard that is related to a health status
factor," such as weight, blood pressure, cholesterol level, or BMI. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
4()(3).
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The impact of the workplace biometric testing policy is unclear
because it is harder to assess other healthism criteria, including
cutting off access to health resources, producing worse health
outcomes, or exacerbating or creating health disparities. If
individuals with certain health conditions refuse to participate,
they subsequently lose access to resources due to the insurance
penalty. Moreover, their refusal could render them ineligible to
participate in the other wellness program initiatives. The
programs therefore could negatively affect health outcomes or
perpetuate health disparities. But further research would be
needed to fully assess the program's potential harms.
The results are equally unclear on the positive end of the
spectrum. The ACA's inclusion of incentives for wellness'
programs merely capitalized on their increasing popularity,
"analogous to putting a car on a train that was already running
down the rails."30 9  While an employee wellness program that
requires medical testing could encourage healthy decisionmaking
and perhaps facilitate choice (depending on whether it offers new
options to participants that would otherwise be unavailable), it
remains to be seen whether such programs actually lower costs,
reduce risks, or produce better health outcomes.310 Hence, even
though the ACA explicitly encourages employers to adopt wellness
programs, given their uncertain effects, perhaps the law should be
agnostic with respect to such initiatives, at least until empirical
evidence of the health benefits is clearer.
The Big Gulp ban provides another challenging scenario for our
frameworks. To start, the highly disfavored status of obesity
309 Judy Peres, Workplace Wellness Programs Popular, But Do They Improve Health?, CHI.
TRIB. (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-workplace-wellness-met-2014
1212-story.html#page=l (quoting Janet Coffman, associate professor of health policy at the
University of California at San Francisco).
a1 See Al Lcwis et al., Workplace Wellness Produces No Saving, HEALTII AFFuAIRS BLOC
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/11/25/workplace-wellness-produces-no-sav
ings/ (finding that "welness programs produce a return-on-investment ... of less than 1-to-
1 savings cost"); MATTKE ET AL., supra note 307 (finding that the positive impact of wellness
programs is limited); Peres, supra note 309 (stating that "experts... question whether




makes it at least possible that the ban was partially motivated by
health-status-related animus. Further, as Wiley has noted, even a
neutral initiative to target obesity can be stigmatizing, if
overweight people are blamed for inspiring a policy that not only
restricts their freedom, but also restricts the freedom of their
thinner counterparts. 311 The ban also restrains private conduct
and affects resources by forcing people to pay more for sugary
beverages, assuming that larger drink sizes receive a volume
discount and that, as result, purchasing the same amount in
multiple smaller sizes will cost more. That said, the Big Gulp ban
does not seem to implicate other healthism factors, such as
adversely affecting individuals' ability to adopt healthy choices,
worsening health outcomes, or perpetuating health disparities.
While the Big Gulp ban might promote healthy decisionmaking by
creating incentives to reduce consumption of sugary beverages or
to indulge in larger quantities of water or diet sodas, it does not
clearly produce positive effects, including positively impacting the
range of available choices, lowering health risks or costs, or
facilitating better health care.
The Snooki tax offers an interesting variation on our analysis of
the Big Gulp ban. Despite what Snooki herself might allege, 312
people who use tanning beds have not been the subject of
widespread animus or stigma on par with smokers or overweight
people. Hence, it seems that the Snooki tax was not animus-
driven, nor will it produce stigma. Moreover, like the Big Gulp
ban, the law is facially neutral, applying equally to habitual and
new users of tanning beds, and to those with skin cancer risk and
those with no underlying risk.313 Like the Big Gulp ban, insofar as
people have to pay more for indoor tanning, the tax punishes
311 Wiley, supra note 212, at 163.
3,2 See Kliff, supra note 273 (stating that Nicole "Snooki" Polizzi felt "'intentionally'
targeted" by the tax); see also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE 100-01 (2013) (discussing Polizzi's reaction to the tax and
politicians' responses).
313 See Excise Tax on Indoor Tanning Services Frequently Asked Questions, IRS.GOV,
https://www.irs.govfbusinesses/small-businesses-self-employed/excise-tax-on-indoor-tannin
g-services-frequently-asked-questions#faq8 (last visited June 4, 2016) (stating that whoever
roceive tanning servicoo muot pay tho indoor tanning oerviccs tax).
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private conduct and could have an effect on resources. Similarly,
the Snooki tax seems unlikely to affect the ability to make healthy
choices, worsen health outcomes, or create health disparities. And
again, like the Big Gulp ban, the Snooki tax may discourage some
people from tanning. In fact, research shows a decrease in indoor
tanning since 2010, implying that the tax could have stopped at
least some indoor tanning enthusiasts from patronizing tanning
salons.314 If the tax is effective at discouraging the use of tanning
beds, it could theoretically lower the risk of skin cancer and also
reduce some health-care costs. But clearer long-term studies are
needed to demonstrate that effect. Lastly, the Snooki tax does
nothing to facilitate choice or to improve the quality of health care
or health-care access.
What makes these three examples harder is that they lack good
empirical data about their effects related to stigma, impact on
vulnerable groups, cost savings, risk reduction, or health
improvement. Time may tell whether those apparently healthist
policies, in fact, foster socially desirable health-status
differentiation. That equivocal posture is challenging, however,
from a prescriptive posture because it does not guide lawmakers or
private actors regarding the permissibility of adopting practices
that turn on health status. They are left instead to implement the
programs and await the verdict regarding whether they are
healthist or not, pending research on the health and other effects.
We acknowledge that this approach creates uncertainty from a
planning perspective. But we nevertheless believe that the law
has a role to play in addressing healthism as it becomes evident,
even if the socially undesirable results were not apparent at the
outset.
314 Jennifer Calfas, Study: Fewer U.S. Adults Use Indoor Tanning Beds, USA TODAY (July
2, 2015, 8:06 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/O1/indoor-tanning-
decline-us-adults/29519255/; Robert King, Tanning Troubles: Fewer People Head Indoors to




Distinguishing on the basis of health status does not always
constitute healthism. While Roberts's previous work introduced
the valuable concept of health-status discrimination, it left several
questions unanswered. To that end, this Article aims to fill some
of those gaps by providing a meaningful account of how to
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of health
status differentiations. Here, we provide two complementary
frameworks: one to ferret out healthism that the law should
prevent and another to identify socially desirable health-based
distinctions. While our frameworks may not always produce clear-
cut results, they nonetheless provide a rubric for assessing
whether law- and policy-makers should classify on the basis of
health status.
Our future work on healthism, 315 following this definitional
explication, will consider more carefully a wide range of examples.
Through that cross-cutting analysis, we hope to provide a more
detailed roadmap to navigate the rising incidence of healthism and
the increased policymaking attention on individuals' health status.
V. CONCLUSION
Discrimination on the basis of health status is both novel and
familiar. Anyone who has been picked last in gym class because of
weight, height, strength, coordination, or any other attribute
perceived to correlate with lower athletic performance knows the
sting of being classified on the basis of health status. And
following health-care reform-as both public and private
regulators attempt to promote health, improve health-care access,
and lower treatment costs-new policies and initiatives that
differentiate either explicitly or implicitly on the basis of health
status have proliferated. Some of these regulations do more harm
than good. They create or perpetuate stigma, impede health-care
access, and entrench health disparities. Hence, they are healthist:
they differentiate on the basis of health in such a way that leads to
systematic disadvantage and is normatively wrong. Other new
315 JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2017).
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policies have the potential to increase access to care, facilitate
health decisionmaking, and lower costs and risks. While these
policies may also differentiate on the basis of health, they are not
discriminatory in the pejorative sense.
In her earlier work, Jessica L. Roberts identified the concept of
healthism. She left several unanswered questions, however,
regarding how to distinguish normatively desirable
differentiations from undesirable ones. Here, we have attempted
to fill that important gap in the literature by providing two
complementary frameworks-one designed to identify when a law-
or policy-maker should prohibit a health-status differentiation and
the other designed to identify when those entities should support a
health-status differentiation. While our schematic will not always
produce definitive answers, we hope that it provides a useful tool
for regulators to weigh the benefits and the drawbacks of health-
status distinctions.

